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Since the time of Descartes, it has been an implicit
assumption of western thought that human reality is composed
of two totally distinct substances:
and the non-physical (non-extended).

the physical (extended)
Explaining the nature

of these two substances, and the relation between them,
has been a central dilemma in western philosophy ever
since.

Edmund Husserl believed these categories are the

result of latent abstraction in our way of conceiving
the world and have no place in reality itself.

By expli-

cating the implications of Brentano's observation that
all consciousness is consciousness of something' (the
theory of intentionality) and by effecting a raaical attitude
shift beyond all naive acceptances to the apodictic ground
of pure experience, Husserl believed he could gain immediate
access to the categories of reality itself.

From the

standpoint of this apodictic realm of pure experience--which
Husserl believed to be prior to all mental abstractions--a
non- dualistic (in the substantial sense) view of human
reality could be obtained.

Emphasis is placed on the

collapse and replacement of Cartesian categories by the
radical categories of transcendental phenomenology.

ii

INTRODUCTION
All of philosophy is based on an assumption, whether
tacit or explicit, of the relationship between consciousness and its objects.
resolved.

This relationship is by no means

Traditionally western philosophy has dealt

with this issue by viewing reality as bifurcated into
a dualism of opposing substances:

the physical and the

non-physical.
The purpose of this paper is to examine Edmund Husserl's attempt to collapse (not unite) these categories.
We shall see that in working out the implications of the
1
theory of intentionality, Husserl abandoned the Cartesian
categories and strove to explicate a non-dualistic yet
not monistic model of reality.

This was made possible

by taking experienced phenomena, purely as experienced,
to be the ground of absolute certitude sought by Descartes.
We shall begin by briefly reviewing Descartes' dualistic theory of man.

Then we will look at Husserl's view

of Descartes' philosophy in order to gain a preliminary
grasp of why Husserl felt compelled to reach for a more
radical understanding of the relationship between consciousness and its objects.

The rest of the paper will examine

1
Brenteno's observation that for consciousness to exist,
it must be consciousness of something.

1

2

Husserl's progressive replacement of Cartesian dualism
with the more radical phenomenological categories.

SECTION A
CARTESIAN DUALISM
Mind-body dualism has been an implicit element of
western thought since Plato, but it was Descartes who
made it an institution.

Much of the philosophy since

Descartes has been in response to his theory of man being
composed of two totally distinct and independent substances
The multitude of theories have traditionally been confined
to three main categories:
1. Interactionism--Both the physical and the non-physical
are real and somehow intermingle, actively influencing
one another.
2. Idealism--The non-physical mind is real; material
objects are non-substantive and are ultimately modes or
aspects of the mental.
3. Materialism--Physical substance is real; all nonphysical aspects can be reduced to material origins.
Recently, however, attempts have been made to totally
abandon these categories in an attempt to describe personhood in a manner which does not give rise to these questions.
This fresh attempt was begun (if, indeed, one philosopher
can be said to begin this sort of thing) by Edmund Husserl.
This new "radical philosophy" must be examined in its
contextual relation to what Ryle termed the "Official
1
Doctrine" of Cartesian Dualism.

1
Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes
& Noble Books, 1949), p. 11.

3

4

While in Paris in November of 1628, Descartes became
engaged in a debate with Chandoux on the nature of science.
Chandoux's contention was that science could only be grounded
on probabilities.

Descartes, however, argued that human

knowledge could have noth_ng but absolute certainty as
ground; and not only that, he had a method of establishing
this absolute certainty once and for all.

2

Thus Descartes

set out to develop a system which would yield a piece
of indubitable knowledge upon which all of human knowledge
could be based.

From this ground of certitude, Descartes

believed his method could be used as an actual process
3
of discovery in any rational inquiry.
Descartes' method for discovering the indubitable
was to suspend the active judging process by systematically withholding "belief from what is not entirely certain
and indubitable,"4 until he at least might "know with
5
certainty that nothing is certain."

According to his

methodology, all knowledge gained through the senses is
immediately subject to doubt (it cannot be known for certain
that I am not dreaming) and must therefore be set aside.
But doubt must not stop with physical objects; even belief
in the arithmetic and geometry which express such extension

2The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, rep. ed. (1972), s.v.
"Descartes, Rene," by Bernard Williams.
3Ibid.
4Rene

Descartes, "Meditations," trans. John Veitch,
in The Rationalists (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974),
p. 112.
5Ibid., p. 118.
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must also be set aside, for it is possible that a "malignant
6
demon" is deceiving me even on these matters.

And since

this means that I cannot be absolutely certain about the
objects of memory, that I possess senses, nor that body,
figure, extension, motion, or place are real, I must assume
that indubitable knowledge is "something different altogether."
But though I must doubt the nature of my existence
and all related knowledge, I cannot doubt that I exist:
Am I, then, at least not something? But I before
denied that I possessed senses or body; I hesitate,
however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent
on the body and the senses that without these I cannot
exist? But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely
nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no
earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore,
at the same time, persuaded that I did not exist?
8
Far from it; I assuredly existed since I was persuaded.
And so, I cannot in any way be deceived about the fact
of my existence, for to be deceived I must exist.
In order for this piece of indubitable knowledge
(expressed by the formula "cogito ergo sum"--I think,
therefore I am) to provide a base from which to build,
it must first be examined for revelations about my essential
existence, or ego.

Descartes' reasoning to the nature

of self-existence from the fact of this existence is based
on the scholastic belief that no property or quality ever
exists independently but is always dependent on some substance.

6Ibid., p. 116
7Ibid., p. 119.
.
8Ibid.

6

According to Descartes, substance is
. .nothing else than a thing which so exists that
it needs no other thing in order to exist. And in
fact only one single substance can be ugderstood which
clearly needs nothing else, namely God.'
Bit there are also "created substances" which are almost
as good; these need "only the concurrence of God in order
to exist."10

These cannot be directly experienced by

us, nowever.
. . .substE.nce cannot first be discovered merely from
the fact that it is a thing that exists, for that
fact alone is not observed by us. We may, however,
easily discover it by means of any one of its attributes
because it is a common notion that nothing is possessed
of no attributes, properties, or qualities. For this
reason, when we perceive any attribute, we therefore
conclude that some existing thing or substance to
which it may be attributed, is necessarily present.11
Descartes held that "each substance has a principle attribute"12
which, when present, indicates the presence of the particular
substance.
. . .extension in length, breadth and depth, constitutes
the nature of corporeal substance; and fl
Vigought constitutes the nature of thinking substance.
By its attributes Descartes deemed the ego to be
a thinking, non-extended substance.

Because it is of

9
Descartes, Rene, The Philosophical Works of Descartes,
trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York:
Dover Publications, 1955) 1:239.
10
Ibid., p. 240.
llIbid.

13
Ibid.
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this class of substance, its existence gives us no verification of physical substance.

Even when I think I perceive

an object, all I can know for certain is that I think
I perceive an object and therefore I, as a thinking substance,
exist.

All I can know for certain about physical objects

(at this point) is that they are a possibility since extension
(the principle attribute of physical substance) is expressed
by pure mathematics and geometry, which are still under
doubt.

Contact of one class of substance with the other

creates special problems.

For me, as a thinking substance,

to make the move from the possibility to the certainty
of physical substance, I must make recourse to God (the
ultimate substance).
The concept of God plays a major role in Descartes'
epistemology.

Beginning with only the indubitability

of his own existence and thoughts (which may refer to
nothing), he must prove the existence of God and then
employ God to justify his belief in the world of objects
beyond the boundaries of his self.

The result is Descartes'

ontological argument which establishes the objective existence
of God from (or as the source of) the intrinsic existence
of the idea of a perfect God in Descartes' consciousness.
This is made possible by the acceptance of a causal principle
which says that the cause of anything must contain at
least as much reality, or perfection, as the effect.
. . .it is manifest by the natural light that there
must at least be as much reality in the efficient
and total cause as in its effect; for whence can the

8

effect draw its reality if not from its cause? And
how could the cause communicate t9A it this reality
unless it possessed it in itself?
Descartes takes this to mean that the thought of a perfect
God must be based on a God at least as peL , ect.
Once the concept of God is established, it can be
used to justify the belief in external objects.

Descartes

notes that ideas of physical objects
. . .are frequently produced in my mind without my
contributing to it in any way, and even frequently
contrary to my will. This faculty must therefore
exist in some substance different from me, in which
all the objective reality of the ideas that are produceq
by this faculty is contained formally or eminently. .
He continues to say that the source of these ideas must
be one of three possibilities:

corporeal nature, consisting

of physical bodies; God himself; or ". . .some creature,
16 And since God is perfect
of rank superior to body."
and cannot be a deceiver (nor would he allow me to be
systematically deceived 17), I am justified in believing
the external world is the cause.

If my strong natural

tendency to believe in physical substance were invalid,
then God would be a deceiver.
Though Descartes' method has brought us at last
to a certainty of both the ego and material objects, it
is imperative to notice that the two are totally distinct.
As stated earlier, the ego, according to Descartes, belongs

14Descartes, The Rationalists, p. 133.
15Ibid., p. 166.
16Ibid.
17Ibid., p. 167.
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to the category of non-extended, thinking substance; material
objects belong to the category of non-thinking, extended
substance.
their very

The two are vastly different in respect to

naebre, yet somehow are intertwined.

right:11y conclude that my essence consists only
..
in my being a thinking thing for a substance whose
whole essence or nature is merely thinking]. And. .
although I certainly do possess a body with which
I am very closely conjoined; nevertheless, because,
on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea
of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended
thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct
idea of body, in as far as it is only an extended
and unthinking thing, it is certain that I [that is,
my mind, by which I am what I am] is [sic] entirely
and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without
lu
it.
The mind and the body have a peculiar association.
When my body is injured, I feel pain.

I even learn to

associate the two, recognizing that my body is in need
of food when I feel the sensation of hunger.

Thus the

mind and body, though remaining totally distinct, form
a certain unity.

The forming of a unity, however, does

not mean the two are of equal status.
. . .nature. . . teaches me to shun what causes in
me the sensation of pain, and to pursue what affords
me the sensation of pleasure, and other things of
this sort; but I do not discover that it teaches me,
in addition to this, from these diverse perceptions
of the senses, to draw any conclusions respecting
external objects without a previous careful and mature
consideration of them by the mind: for it is, as
appears to me, the office of the mind alone, and not
of the composite whole of mile and body, to discern
the truth in those matters.

18Ibid., p. 165.
181bid., p. 169.
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Descartes' position, then, is that by proceeding
to doubt every thing that can possibly be doubted, we
arrive at the indubitable ground of the ego--I think,
therefore I am.

This ego is seen by its attributes to

be a thinking, non-extended substance and, as such, provides
no immediate evidence for the reality of non-thinking,
extended substance.

But because Descartes salvaged the

concept of God by means of his ontological argument, we
can reason that material objects do exist; if the natural
tendency to believe in the objects of the sensations I
am experiencing is not valid, then God would be a deceiver
and therefore not perfect.

Hence physical objects exist.

Mind and body necessarily remain totally distinct, yet
interact to the point of apparent unity.
Descartes' philosophy raises many questions, but
for the present discussion, two main issues will become
prominent.
action:

First and most obvious is the problem of inter-

How do two totally distinct substances interact

with the intimacy required in Descartes' model of a person?
This problem is not limited to mind-body dualism, but
arises whenever a dualistic theory appears.

Materialism

and Idealism are largely the results of attempting to
solve this problem.
solipsism.

The second problem is metaphysical

All I have access to is my own experience.

If ultimately my experiences are subjective, how do I
know for certain that there is any thing other than me

11

and my experiences?

We shall see that Husserl offers

a way around these problems and does not rely on divine
intercession.

SECTION B
PRELUDE TO HUSSERL
For our examination of Husserl's collapse of mindbody dualism, we shall use his Logical Investigations,

IL3!!!,.

Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European

Sciences as primary sources, despite the popular theory
that the Crisis marks a distinct departure from his earlier
works.

Though the departure view may apply when dealing

with certain specific elements of Husserl's phenomenology,
it will be seen that his investigation of the intentional
relation between subjective conscious acts and the objective
world is a sustained effort.

An analysis of the results

of this investigation must, of course, be tempered by
the knowledge that Husserl's works were never a complete,
refined philosophical argument for a particular view,
but were examples of philosophical-investigation-in-progress.
Thus we shall treat each work as a further development
of his preceeding investigations.
But before we can grasp Husserl's own philosophy,
we must first examine his conception of Descartes' philosophy.
This will give us an understanding of the ramifications
of Cartesian dualism which provided the impetus for Husserl's phenomenology.

12

•
SECTION C
•

HUSSERL'S VIEW OF CARTESIAN DUALISM
Any theory (including foundational beliefs such
as world views, religious views, morality, etc., whether
philosophical or not) presupposes assumptions concerning
the relationship between consciousness and the world.
Usually these are smuggled into the belief system by rote.
The average man in the street is unaware that he holds
any such presuppositions (or more likely, he is unaware
that there is the possibility of an alternative set) yet
they shape his very conception of--and hence his actions
in--the world.

It is not difficult to see that such presup-

positions held collectively by a culture have staggering
effects.
As was stated earlier, most of western thought since
Descartes has been under the Jhadow of Cartesian dualism.
Indeed post-Cartesian philosophy can be roughly categorized
according to the various options of handling the dilemmas
of physical/non-physical dualism.

These have been listed

'Post-Carteas Interactionism, Idealism, and Materialism.
sian philosophy is caught in an interesting bind:

to

lit should be noted that these are broad categories
and that many subheadings may exist within each.

13
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even attempt a solution is to validate the problem.

It

is the attempt to deny the validity of the problem itself-and hence the need of a solution--that makes Husserl's
philosophy radical.

Husserl believed the problem to be

a bogus one, but one that has worked its way into the
fiber of the age.
Husserl maintains that mind-body bifurcation has
been artificially superimposed on reality due to an abstraction.
This abstraction began as an innate tendency to view the
world as composed of two separate realms:

the physical

realm of nature and the non-physical realm of the psyche.
This tendency, which had its beginnings with the ancient
Greeks, found its way into religious thought and therefore
into the culture's storehouse of inherent assumptions.
The tendency to perceive the world as bifurcated along
this line of abstraction was enhanced by the adopting
2
of the "ready-made geometry of the ancients."
The tendency to divide reality according to abstract
distinctions remained latent until Galileo discovered
that much could be accomplished by limiting scientific
endeavor to the purely objective world of physical objects-the world as expressed in pure mathematics and geometry.
Husserl felt that this limited science to a realm of abstrac-

2
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences
and 1anscendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston,
Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 221.

•
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tion, thus unavoidably creating a "natural-scientific
rationality"3 which is disjunct from experienced reality.
. . .Galileo abstracts from the subjects as persons
leading a personal life; he abstracts from all that
is in any way spiritual, from all cultural properties
which are attached to things in human praxis. The
result of this abstraction is the things purely as
bodies; but these are taken as concrete real objects,
the totality of which makes up a world which becomes
the subject matter of research. One can truly say
that the idea of nature as a really self-enclosed
world of bodies first emerges with Galileo. A consequence
of this, along with mathematization, which was too
quickly taken for granted,is [the idea of] a selfenclosed natural causality in which every occurrence
is determined unequivocally and in advance. Clearly
the way is thus prepared for dualisw, which appears
immediately afterward in Descartes.
When the valid field of scientific inquiry was restricted
to 'concrete real objects', which were signified through
the language of mathematics and geometry (i.e., the idiom
for expressing extension), a residue of experienced reality
remained unaccounted for.

Descartes merely uncovered

and developed the implications of Galileo's abstract view
of nature.

Through his inquiry, Descartes revealed the

psyche as the residue of experienced reality which could
not be accounted for by Galilean physics. Pure bodies-which exist as objects of measurement--were reified as
a closed realm of reality.

Hence it followed that the

psyche (which is composed of that aspect of experience
3Ibid., p. 61.
4
Ibid., p. 60. When Husserl uses the term 'spiritual'
in this context, he is referring to such aspects of experienced
reality as art and culturally shared meaning values. The
connotations of the term which are derived from the assumption
of the Cartesian split must be abandoned as no longer applicable.

16

perceived as 'my own'--i.e., the internal dialogue, remembrances, etc.) should also be a closed and distinct realm
of reality.

Thus it was not long before psychology appeared

as a new field of science.
Descartes interpreted the split to be between a
realm of extended substance and a realm of non-extended
substance.

These substances were said to be separate

and distinct because each possessed a totally distinct
set of attributes.

Despite this, psychology (due largely

to Hobbes and Locke) soon came to be "naturalized" as
5
a field of science parallel to physics.
It should be kept in mind that neither Galileo nor
Descartes were deliberately making the abstraction from
the world as actually experienced to the mathematized
world of the realm of physical nature.

Their tendency

to think of the world as bifurcated had been latent.
Galileo and Descartes were attempting to render the world
accessible to rational inquiry, and although they opened
the way for much beneficial progress, they failed to notice
the abstraction inherent in their method.
. . .because of the way in which the ready-made geometry
of the ancients was taken over, the idealization which
thoroughly determines its sense was almost forgotten;
and on the psychic side [such an] idealization, as
an actually executed and original accomplishment in
a manner appropriate to the nature of tge psychic,
was not required, or rather not missed.
5
Ibid., p. 63.
6Ibid., p. 221.
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Once the dualism (which had remained implicit ". .
throughout the millennia. . ."7) was made explicit by
Descartes, the two branches of study became fields of
scientific discipline in a manner never before possible.
The ancients had individual investigations and theories
about bodies, but not a closed world or bodies as
subject matter of a universal science of nature.
They also had investigations of the human and animal
soul, but they could not have a psychology in the
modern sense, a psychology which, because it had universal
nature and a science of nature before it [as a modell,
could strive for a corresponding universality, i.e0
within a similarly self-enclosed field of its own.u
After the world had been formally severed into a
corporeal aspect and a psychic aspect, the problem immediately arose concerning the obvious interaction of the
two spheres.

Our everyday lives are based on--and are

examples of--the interaction between these aspects of
the world.

But now the rational explanation of this pheno-

mena posed an embarrassing problem.

Descartes had invoked

the concep: of God to bridge the chasm, but this attempt
failed to provide intellectual satisfaction and philosophy
was presented with a new theme.
In general, the separating-off of the psychic
caused greater and greater difficulties whenever problems
of reason made themselves felt. Of course it was
only later that these difficulties became so pressiag
that they became the central theme of philosophy,
in the great investigatioas on human understanding,
in "critiques of reason."'

7
Ibid., p. 75.
8Ibid., p. 60.
9
Ibid., p. 62.
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The constituting of a universe of purely corporeal
bodies is a mental act of idealization which was useful
in the development of a science based on mathematics.
But this realm of abstraction from evtbryday experience
leaves a portion of experienced reality 'unaccounted for.
Because the abstraction necessary to isolate a sphere
of extended oblects of experience was not taken into account,
both the sphere of extension and its resulting 'metaphysical'
residue were assigned their own substantiality.
lies the problem, according to Husserl.

Herein

If we take the

bifurcating abstraction into account, the Cartesian dualism
of two distinct substances is seen to be invalid.

Rather

than raw reality, Descartes had examined reified abstractions
10
.abstracta are not 'substances.'"
and ".
This assigning of substantiality to what Husserl
believed to be 'abstracta' plagues philosophers even today.
Many still feel an urgent need to devise some new trick
argument that will explain how man can be composed of
both physical and non-physical substances.

Many believe

that if this view cannot somehow be salvaged, there will
be no way to preserve our personhood.

Ironically, it

is often this school of philosophy which most vehemently
denounces phenomenology when Husserl was in fact attempting
to eliminate the problem they consider so threatening.
Once the Cartesian categories are admitted, their collapse

10
Ibid., p. 229.
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would result in the conceptual reduction of our very being
(i.e., in an Idealistic or Materialistic sense).

Thus

many philosophers—while, confounded by the ensuing dilemmas-doggedly maintain and defend the categories. This is
Vib
apparently due to the inbred belief in the substantiality
of a self-enclosed realm of physical bodies.

When the

substantiality of a physical realm is assumed, the denial
of substantiality to its residue of experience would have
unfavorable implications, especially in questions of morality.
But Husserl does not deny the substantiality of
one in favor of the other.

Instead he denies the autonomous

substantiality of both, reducing them to the one heading
of 'lived experience.'

The enigmas of Cartesian dualism

present themselves only on a conceptual level (as does
the dualism itself, according to Husserl) and do not appear
in actual experience.

Husserl's belief that the evidence

of lived experience is more primary than traditional theoretical dilemmas--and the resulting dismissal of abstract
theory in favor of what is actually experienced--is central
to phenomenology.
It is human beings that are concretely experienced.
Only after their corporeity has been abstracted—within
the universal abstraction which reduces the world
to a world of abstract bodies--does the question arise,
presenting itself now as so obvious, as to thellother
side," that is, the complimentary abstraction.
Husserl's insight--that we experience humans and
not corporeal bodies and/or disembodied souls--is the

11

Ibid., p. 228.
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clue we shall use for an understanding of his phenomenology.
Though the role of the Cartesian dogma in our everyday
life is not readily apparent (especially while standing
in the dogma), it results in an ever broadening split
between the world of experience and the world of the mathematically exact sciences.

This split produces anomalies

of reason which are usually overlooked by both the man
in the street and the working scientist, but for the philosopher, these anomalies are indications that our understanding of reality is awry.
As previously stated, any attempt to unify the psychic
substance with the corporeal substance validates the split.
If, as Husserl believed, the bifurcation was the product
of an abstraction performed by rote, then no philosophy
which presupposes the mind-body dualism can accurately
portray concretely experienced reality.

For Husserl,

the option left open was to find a point prior to the
bifurcation and build a unified science--and philosophy--from
that base.
Descartes had attempted to find a foundation for
rational inquiry and, through his famous method of doubt,
had determined that the starting point should be one's
own point of existence: the ego.

Husserl believed this

to have been a monumental discovery but one which Descartes
neglected to develop because he failed to stick with ".

21

what we find actually given. .

..12

Descartes had made

the discovery that all knowledge is ultimately referred
to the ego but then, according to Husserl, had promptly
misinterpreted his discovery due to hidden presuppositions
which shaped his thought.

His discovery was annulled

by "things taken for granted throughout the millenia."13
Descartes had inquired as to the nature of the ego which
he discovered as apodictically posited.

He eliminated

corporeal substance (for it can be doubted) and was left
with the psyche, which he interpreted as the pure soul.
Hence the notion of a person as a combination of extended
body and non-extended soul (each with a distinct substance)
arises.

But in doing this, Descartes was assuming the

validity of the Galilean world of bodies.14

In allowing

this dogma to shape his thought, Descartes had fallen
from the radicalness he initially proclaimed.

Thus, he

identified the ego with the psyche--which gave birth to
the problem of interaction and left rational inquiry ungrounded--and missed the turn to the transcendental ego.
Husserl took up Descartes' project of grounding
knowledge and tried to do it without admitting entry to
the dualistic dogma, not by attempting a solution to its

12
Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction
to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague t Martinus
Nijhoff, 1977), p. 24.
13
Idem, The Crisis, p. 75.
14
Ibid., p. 79.
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resulting dilemmas.

As we shall see, Husserl takes as

ground the world-as-experienced (the 'Life-world'), which
15
is the presupposition of all forms of inquiry.

We shall

also see that this is made possible through an expanded
aefinition of 'experience.'

15Aron
Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966),
p. 418.

SECTION D
THE BEGINNINGS OF HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY
Husserl took Descartes' attempt to ground rational
knowledge as the beginning for his transcendental phenomen1
ology yet denied most of the claims of Cartesian philosophy.
More precisely, Husserl wanted to take up Descartes' motives
in a "quasi-Cartesian fashion" which would overcome ". • •
„2
the hidden but already felt naivete of earlier philosophizing.
Transcendental phenomenology's beginning is, therefore, parallel to Descartes' beginning:
•

the search for

. .absolute insights, insights behind which one cannot

go back any further."3

Thus Husserl took up Descartes'

initiative to find a piece of apodictic evidence; that
is, a piece of evidence that would reveal itself in a
manner such that its non-being would be absolutely inconceivabla.

Because Husrl, like Descartes, believed the

4
being of the world to be obvious but not apodictic, he
saw the turn away from the world toward the subject himself

1
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p.l.
2Ibid., p. 6
3Ibid., p. 2.
4

Ibid., pp. 15-18.
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as the move which made Descartes ". . .the primally founding
genius of all modern philosophy."5
Descartes had expressed what he believed to be apodictic subjectivity as ego cogito--"I think." Husserl expanded
6
this expression to ego cogito cogitatum, believing that
this accounted for what Descartes had missed:

"The essence
ni

of consciousness, in which I live as my own self.

The addition of the one word to Descartes' famous formula
marks the beginning of the split from Cartesian categories
which gave transcendental phenomenology a life of its
own.
Descartes took the ego cogito, the "I think," to
be an indubitable expression of a complete, coherent selfexperience.

But Husserl points out that although it was

implied, Descartes failed to fully explicate the 'intention8
ality' of consciousness.

By intentionality Husserl means

the
. . .universal fundamental property of consciousness:
to be consciousness of something; as cogito, to bear
within itself its coTitatum.'
For this reason consciousness can not accurately be expressed
as "I think," but must be stated as "I think x."

To examine

5Idem, Crisis, p. 73.
6Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 33.
7
Idem, "Paris Lectures," in Phenomenology and Existentialism ed. Robert C. Solomon (Lanham, Md.: University
Press of America, 1980), p. 53.
8
ldem, Crisis, p. 82.
9
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 33.
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consciousness otherwise is to examine an abstraction;
and we have seen the dangers involved in conferring the
status of substantial being upon an abstraction.

Once

the intentional nature of consciousness is accounted for,
its essential structure is revealed.
According to Husserl, consciousness must always
consist of an act (coqito) and an object, or more technically,
the "meaning" of the act (cogitatum).

These two aspects

can never concretely exist separately; only as abstracta
may we deal with them individually.

For this reason we

can never accurately speak of consciousness and experience
in separate terms, but must refer to conscious experience
10
(or phenomena).

We shall see momentarily that it is

within the stream of conscious experience that phenomenology
will take its base.
Husserl believed that Descartes' method of doubt,
although a definite and crucial step in the right direction,
is inadequate for the more radical needs of transcendental
phenomenology.

Because it is impossible to simultaneously

doubt and accept a single thing, Descartes' ". . .universal
11
attempt at doubt is just an attempt at universal denial."
But even as radically investigating philosophers, we cannot

10Robert C. Solomon, ed., Phenomenology and Existentialism, p. 19.
11Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to
Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1931), p. 98.
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fully deny the being of a phenomenon (i.e., a conscious
experience).

What we can do is suspend all judgment con-

cerning the validity claim of the meant object of the
phenomena by 'bracketing' the entire phenomena--act and
meaning--thus reducing it to the status of pure experience.
This bracketing, or suspension, of the natural or everyday
acceptance of world validity is termed 'epoche.'

The

epoche, Husserl maintains, can even be applied to things
held with unshakable conviction whereas Descartes' doubt--a
full denial of being--could not.

Hence, Husserl refers

to the epoche as a *disconnecting of a living conviction
.12
that goes on living.
To understand the bracketing function of the epoche,
we must first consider Husserl's initial goal:

a piece

of knowledge that is absolutely certain--"an Archimedian
13
which will serve as the unshakable foundation
point"
on which all of human knowledge can be built. Husserl
distinguishes two types of evidence by means of which
we attain knowledge.
The first type of evidence is that of 'harmonious
experience.' This is the evidence by which the world around
us is presented in everyday life.

If a table continues

to harmoniously present itself in all the proper modes,

12
Ibid.
13The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, rep. ed. (1972),
s.v. "Husserl, Edmund," by Richard Schmitt.
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I accept it as existent:
around it next time.

I will unquestioningly walk

But acceptance of an object through

harmonious evidence is dependent upon continued harmonious
presentations.

Adequate evidence for absolute certainty

14
would "lie at infinity."

Thus harmonious presentation,

though adequate for everyday life,

alls short of the

demands of a radically meditating philosopher.
The second type of evidence Husserl refers to is
'apodicticity.'

Apodictic evidence, though given simul-

taneously with the evidence of harmonious presentations,
e
is evidence of a "higher dignity"15--it is immediate evidenc
of itself.

When I experience a table, it is absolutely

indubitable that I am having the experience of the table.
That the table actually exists remains open to doubt.
Recognizing the distinction between harmonious evidences
and apodicticity forms the beginning of the epoche and
16
the ensuing move to the transcendental standpoint.
The disconnecting of oneself from the validity claims
of all phenomena is the key to understanding transcendental
phenomenology, according to Husserl.

Not only must one

understand this alteration of attitude, one must undergo
17 To
and maintain the "radical and universal epoche,"

14Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, P. 15.
15Ibid.
16Ibid., pp. 14-17.
17
Idem, Crisis, p. 80.
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t fully
attempt the study of Husserl's philosophy withou
"destroy
regarding the significance of the epoche is to
.18
the whole meaning of . . . phenomenology.
everyday
Prior to the epoche we live in the attitude of
life, which is termed the 'natural stance.'

From the

harmonnatural stance I fully accept the validity of the
iously presented world.

Any discordant presentation is

on.
debilitated to the status of hallucination or illusi
life
In the attitude of the natural stance, my conscious
19
perceive
is caught up in and presupposes the world --which I
ted
by implication of the manifold harmoniously presen
20
objects distributed about me.
Husserl also distinguishes
"straightforwardly" executed grasping, perceiving,
remembering, predicating, valuing, purposing, etc.,
grasping
from the reflections by means of which alone, as
ard
htforw
straig
tithe
acts belonging to a new level
acts become accessible to us.'
itself
Through a direct act of consciousness, the object
is under scrutiny.

Through reflection the act of perceiving

perceived
the object--which includes within it the object as
scrutiny.
according to the intentionality theory--comes under
le,
Perceiving straightforwardly, we grasp, for examp
tion
reflec
in
Only
the house and not the perceiving.

18
Idem, Ideas, p. 16.
19Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 32.
20
Idem, Crisis, p. 143.
21
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 33.
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do we "directs' ourselves to the perceiving itse14,
and to its perceptualdirectedness to the house.'"'
By means of everyday and descriptive psychological
reflection, my conscious acts, through which I relate
to the world around me, are revealed.

That is, I gain

access to the flowing stream of cogitationes which are
presupposed as the valid psychic components of my existence
as a man in the world.

This aspect of my everyday existence

is referred to as the psyche.

23

We have seen that Descartes

isolated the psyche through such reflection--which "makes
an object out of what was previously a subjective process
but not objective"24--and assigned to it the substantiality
of an autonomous realm of being.

He then identified this

with the ego.
Descartes was led to this position because he abandoned
his radical demand for apodictic evidence and remained in
the natural stance, assuming the validity of the world
presented through harmonious evidence.

Through the non-

radical reflection of the natural stance, the cogito of
straightforward perception is revealed as

. .data belonging

to the world, which is presupposed as existing--that is
25
Any
to say, taken as the psychic components of a man."

22Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 33.
23Ibid., p. 32.
24Ibid., p. 34.
25Ibid., p. 32.
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subjectivity which is revealed through a reflection from
the natural stance remains ". . .on the footing of the
world already given as existing. . . ."26
But we have seen that although harmonious presentation

is sufficient to get us through life in our everyday--or
naive--stance, it does not possess the certitude demanded
by the philosopher radically searching for the ground
of reality itself.

It is the move beyond the natural

stance which places phenomenology firmly in the transcendental realm of apodictic certitude.

This is accomplished

by the epoche.
For example, when I perceive this paper, its actual
existence, though obvious, is not apodictic.

It is, however,

apodictic that I am experiencing the perception of this
paper located in a particular relationship to its surrounding
objects--the ones actually seen and those inferred.

To

attain a ground of apodictic validity, then, I must bracket-or set aside--all claims of being and non-being made by
the object of perception.
Instead of simply existing for us--that is, being
accepted naturally by us in our experiential believing
in its existence--the world is for us only something
that claims being. . . . In short, not just corporeal
Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world
is for me, from now on, only ..,phenomenon of being,
instead of something that is. '

26Ibid., p. 34.
27Ibid., pp. 18-19.
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This is made possible by a radical 'objectifying'
reflection.

Natural reflection (both of everyday life

and that of a psychology examining the life of the psyche)
alters the naive subjective process by making an object
of the original straightforward grasping act.

In reflection

the original process remains as the object of the reflection
whose task is "to consider it and explicate what can be
28
But while natural reflection reveals the
found in it."
data given as being the psychic components of a man in
1
the world of everyday life, the reflection of the epoche
performs a more radical objectification by making the
shift from a naive acceptance of the validity of what
is harmoniously presented to the apodictic ground of the
pure experience of the presentation.

Thus, radical reflection

differs from natural reflection because
. . .the parallel data, with their like components,
are not taken in this manner, because the whole world,
when one is in the phenomenological attitude, is not
accept!g as actuality, but only as an actuality-phenomenon.
The epoche removes the radically meditating philosopher
from the natural stance by reducing the tacit belief in
the validity of the natural world from a lived acceptance
to an acceptance phenomenon.

28
Ibid., p. 34.
29Ibid., p. 32.

In other words, the naive
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attitude of acceptance is itself placed before the radically
objectifying reflection of the epoche, thus disconnecting
the meditating philosopher from the natural footing of
the world.
my ink pen.

For example, in the natural stance I perceive
And simple reflection reveals that I, this

man, am perceiving my ink pen.

Scrutiny has been shifted

from the object given/accepted as existent to the cogito--my
conscious act--of perceiving the pen which obviously exists
in my hand.

But after performing the epoche, the ink

pen (and also myself, as a man holding the ink pen
is not viewed as either existing or not existing.

30
)
Instead,

scrutiny is placed on an ink pen perception (cogito-cogitatum).
I, the meditating philosopher, am no longer concerned
with the cogito itself or with the cogitatum itself.
Rather, the inquiry is directed to the totality of the
perception as it is concretely experienced and naively
lived through in its full intentionality: cogito-cogitatum.
Husserl believed this removal of perspective (or
shifting of attitude) from living the cogito of perceiving
the world to passively observing the fullness of the cogitocogitatum relationship by means of the epoche would simultaneously reveal apodictic evidence and propel the meditating
philosopher into the realm of pure conscious experience.
It is this change of attitude which is the key to transcendental phenomenology.

30
For a more detailed account of this subject, see
Section E below.
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Not a few shut themselves out altogether from the
start because they cannot bring themselves to grasp
intentional experience, the experience of perception,
for instance, in company with its own proper essence
as such. They do not succeed because they cannot
replace the practice of living in perception, their
attention turned towards the perceived object both
in observation and in theoretical inquiry, by that
of directing their glance upon the perceiving itself,
or upon the way in which the perceived object with
its distinguThhing features is presenzed, and of taking
that which presented itself in the immanent analysis
31
of the essence just as it actually does present itself.

31
Husserl, Ideas, p. 236.

SECTION E
THE UNCOVERING OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO
We must not take the abstention of the epoche to
be a Cartesian denial.

The entire world continues to

appear exactly as before but I, the meditating philosopher,
have reduced all experience of the world to world-phenomena.
It must not be overlooked that epoche with respect
to all worldly being does not at all change the fact
that the manifold cogitationes relating to what is
worldly bear this relation within themselves, that,
e.g., the perception of this table still is, as it
was before, precisely a perception of this table.
In this manner, without exception, every conscious
process is, in itself, consciousness of such and such,
regardless of what the rightful actuality-status of
this objective such-and-such may be, and regardless
of the circumstances that I, as standing in the transcendental attitude, abstain from acceptance of this idoject
as well as from all my other natural acceptances.
Indeed, the world appears after the epoche exactly
as it did before.

Included in the appearance after the

epoche, however, are the naive beliefs and acceptances
(through which I live in the world while in the natural
stance) that also fall before the reduction.

My naive

involvement in the world, through beliefs and tacit assumptions, is presented as part of the world-phenomenon which
I, the radical meditator, passively observe as mere-phenonmenon.

1Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 32-33.
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as reflecting philosophically, no longer keep
. .
in effect (no longer accept) the natural believing
in existence involved in experiencing the world--though
that believing too is still there and grasped by my
noticing regard. . .everything meant in such accepting
or positing processes of consciousness (the meant
judgment, theory, value, end, or whatever it is) is
still retained completely-but with acceptance-modification, "mere-phenomenon."'
It is true that while in the natural stance I experience
objects as existing across varying strata (such as corporeal
bodies or pure numerical and geometrical figures) and--through
naive reflection--the flowing stream of cogitationes I
call my psychic life.

But I am not justified in assigning

substantiality to these varying strata, for their mode
of appearance is through harmonious presentation, thus
lacking apodicticity.
By reflectively placing scrutiny on the intentional
fullness of the cogito-cogitatum relationship, however,
the apodictic realm of experience itself is opened for
examination by the meditating philosopher.

When examining

only that which is given as apodictic and ". . .keeping
at a distance all interpretations that transcend the given,"'
the cogitationes and their cogitatum (in all possible
strata of presentation) of the natural stance are collapsed
to the one heading "mere phenomenon."

Such categories

as physical and non-physical, then, reduce to abstract
subheadings of the one apodictically grounded heading.

2Ibid., pp. 19-20.
3Idem, Ideas, p. 242.
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By performing the reflection of the epoche, the
flow of world-accepting cogitationes and their object
(the factual world) is reduced to cogitatum of a higher
stream of abstaining cogito.

This creates a unique attitude

for the meditating philosopher.

While the radical reflection

passively and non-positionally looks on, the naive living
in the world continues just as before.

In the perception

of a house, for instance, the cogitationes within the
natural attitude assume the validity of, and take a position
in relation to, the factual house.

Because the factual

house--indeed, the factual world--is given as lying "outside"
of consciousness, this entire realm is referred to as
'transcendent.' Hence the ego, which natural and psychological
4
reflection reveal living through the stream of coaitationes
that have their footing on--that is, which presuppose
the validity of--the natural world, is termed the 'transcendent,'
or 'natural' Ego.

The Ego that lives through the abstaining

cogitationes (which have as their cogitatum the entire
naive cogito-cogitatum interaction) is called 'transcendental.'
As we have said, the radical reflection of the epoche-which reveals the transcendental ego--does not disturb
the flow of the naive cogito-cogitatum by objectifying
it.

The transcendental level cogitationes have as their

4Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 31.
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cogitatum the pure experience of, for example, an actually
existing man believing that he is perceiving an actually
existing house through his acts of consciousness (which
are revealed through naive reflection as his psyche).
The transcendental Ego abstains from any position taking
as to the being or non-being of this experience; all experiences--no matter what their claim to substantial existence-are reduced to mere phenomenon of being.
The reflecting Ego's non-participation in the "positing"
(believing, taking a position as to being) that is
part of the straightforward house-perception in no
wise alters the fact that his reflecting experiencing
is precisely an experiencing experiencing of the houseperception with all its moments, which belonged to
it before and are continuing to take shape. And among
these, in our example, are the moments of the perceived
"house", purely as perceived. There is lacking neither,
on the one side, the existence-positing (perceptual
belief) in the mode of certainty, which is part of--normal
--perceiving, nor, on the other side (that of the
appearing h9use), the character of simple "factual
existence."'
While the Ego (which radical reflection reveals
as living through the transcendental intentional acts)
abstains from all participation that presupposes the factual
existence-status of any phenomenon, the naive ego (which
natural and psychological reflection reveals living through
the naive cogitationes) remains immersed in the presupposition of an existing world.

Thus the subjectivity

of an inquiring philosopher is split into the transcen-

5
Ibid., pp. 34-35.
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dental Ego and the transcendent ego; that is, into the
subjective pole of flowing intentional acts that are intuitively apodictic in themselves and into the subjective
pole of flowing intentional acts which naively presuppose
the validity of a world presented through harmonious presentations.
If the Ego, as naturally immersed in the world, experiencingly and otherwise, is called "interested" in the
world, then the phenomenologically altered--and, as
so altered, continually maintained--attitude consists
in a splitting of the Ego: in that the phenomenological
Ego establishes himself as "disinkerested on-looker",
above the naively interested Ego.
This splitting of the Ego is a crucial element of
Husserl's philosophy, yet it is left open to a variety
of interpretations.

Much of the disagreement among Husserl's

successors has its roots in this central point.

Of course,

a large portion of the perplexity arises from the vagueness
of what the term 'Ego' refers to.

Before we can know

what it means to 'split' an Ego, we must know what an
Ego is.

A discussion of the Ego in Husserl's phenomenology

will follow shortly, but for the present we may say that
there is no clear, concise definition of 'Ego' in Husserl's
phenomenology.

Husserl believed that the defining of

the Ego was not a prerequisite for phenomenology, but
its task.

The lack of clarity concerning the precise

nature of one's own being is the motivating force behind

6
Ibid., p. 35.
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phenomenology; thus the ". . .phenomenology of this selfconstitution coincides with phenomenology as a whole."7
If this is not complication enough, Husserl also
failed to specify the nature of this split:
logical, epistemological, or otherwise?

Is it onto-

The initial encounter

with this portion of phenomenology is likely to be exasperating, for its crucial claim appears to be, "We know not
what splits, we know not how."

Yet closer examination

reveals that the epoche dictates the nature of the split,
and determining what is split becomes a valid field of
inquiry.
There are two obvious ways of interpreting the split:
either it is an ontological split (meaning that I, the
meditating philosopher now consist of two distinct Egos8)
or the split is epistemological (meaning that the split
does not result in a second really existing Ego, but merely
in an alternative manner of obtaining knowledge of one's
own being).

The epoche, however, seems to rule out both

of these options.
One might easily be led to read the 'splitting of
the Ego' as an ontological distinction, for Husserl maintains

7Ibid., p. 68.
8Because the term 'Ego' involves inherent complications,
we shall, for the present, take it to be the equivalent
of the unitary subjectivity (later to be called "monadic")
implied as existing through the flow of cogitationes-cogitatum.
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that the natural world (which includes the naive ego)
9
presupposes the transcendental Ego.

That which is apodictic

is the necessary presumption of that which is deduced
from harmonious presentations.

It was the task of the

epoche, after all, to bring forth the previously unacknowledged ".

.being that is intrinsically prior to the

world. . ." which is the ". . .already presupposed basis
10
for the existence of the world."
The split is between two distinct streams of cogitationes (taken with their intended objects of course).
The natural stream livingly accepts the full implications
of the validity of the factual world.

The transcendental

stream has as its meant object the entire natural stream
(cogito-cogitatum) yet takes no position (which would
necessarily presuppose an inference based on what has
been, and what so far continues to be, harmoniously presented)
concerning the validity of the presentation.

Instead,

the transcendental level of cogito-cogitatum, as pure
experience of all presentations as mere phenomenon, is
the apodictic ground from which the natural world can
be inferred.
The ontological interpretation of the Ego-split,
then, entails that the transcendental Ego, as ground for
the natural world, enjoys ontological priority over the

9Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 26.
10
Ibid., p. 18.
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natural ego and its world of interaction. The transcendental Ego at least must have the status of ontically
valid being.

When this interpretation is taken, problems

concerning the status of the natural ego (which is I,
this man in the world

11
) and his relation to the transcen-

dental Ego (for whom even the "intermundane existence
12
is reduced to mere-phenomenon)
of my own Ego as human"
arise, for the natural ego continues a life of his own.
The difficulties, however, do not have a legitimate
place in Husserl's phenomenology if the epoche is faithfully
observed.

The epoche serves the function of reducing

all claims of substantiality and valid existence (including
their natural acceptance) to mere phenomena.

The transcen-

dental stance is presented as having priority over the
natural stance.

To accept this appearance as valid, thus

attaching substantiality (or ontic validity) to the Ego
which exists through those intentional acts presented
as having priority, is to fall from the transcendental
stance.

The assigning of validity to any appearance can

only be done from the natural stance--or rather, the acceptance
of validity places one in the natural stance.

Husserl

called for a "universal criticism of consciousness" which
13
would be "grounded to the utmost and apodictically."

11

Ibid., p. 19

12Ibid.
13Ibid., p. 35
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This idea demands an absolute universal criticism,
which, for its part, by abstension from all positions
that already give anything existent, must first create
14
for itself a universe of absolute freedom from prejudice.
To take the presentation of the transcendental Ego
as a structure with ontological validity is to disregard
the call for

an abstention from all positions that already

give any thing existent."

The notion of a "universe of

absolute freedom from prejudice" (prejudice here meaning
presupposition of any sort) taken in the most radical
manner possible brings us nearer to Husserl's understanding
of 'transcendental Ego.'

When the epoche is performed,

no validity judgments apply to any mode of being presented
(including own-being).

From the transcendental stance,

non-being is seen to be a mode of being

15

and all ontological

categories are reduced to mere-phenomenon.

Hence it appears

that the splitting of the Ego must be an epistemological
division.
An epistemological interpretation of the split between
the transcendental and the natural streams of cogitationes
would hold that the epoche is a technique by which we
reflectively gain knowledge of the conscions acts through
which we normally attain our knowledge--in short, a reflective
objectification of our very subjectivity.

The transcen-

dental Ego, then, has no ontological validity, but is

14Ibid.
15
Ibid., p. 58.
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merely a product of the reflective method by which we
bring our conscious acts (through which we live) before
scrutiny.
This interpretation, however, does not and it seems
cannot take the epoche fully into account.

Like the reflec-

tion of descriptive psychology, the epistemological interpretation assumes the validity of "I, the man who is thus
investigating"; it is my pure subjectivity which this
novel reflective method reveals in such a unique manner.
The attempt to understand the transcendental Ego is carried
out from the perspective of 'I, this man in the world'.
But as we have seen, the epoche demands a radical universal
criticism which cannot accept even this presupposition--which
appears as so evidently a given fact--without the acceptance
modification 'mere-phenomenon.'
It could possibly be argued that a form of epistemological interpretation could survive the reduction of
the epoche.

Perhaps it could be claimed that since the

pure experience of mere-phenomenon (which is apodictically
evidence of itself and nothing more) is the knowledge
from which we naively infer the factual world; it is the
epistemic ground of all knowledge.

But even this modified

epistemological interpretation is a product of attempting
to grasp the transcendental stance without fully abandoning
the natural stance:

the validity of our everyday world
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is assumed and the transcendental stance is inferred as
the ground of our knowledge thereof.

This violates Husserl's

insistence that while the epoche is fully maintained we
remain in a stance from which any information already
possessed--including the existence of my self or of a
world--is suspended, leaving only the direct and immediate
given as given.
That signifies restriction to the pure data of transcendental reflection, which therefore must be taken precisely
as they are given in simple evidence, purely "intuitively",
and always kept free from all interpretatioE that
read into them more than is genuinely seen. ‘'
In the discussions which follow we shall see that
the relationship between the knower and the known--subject
and object--is altered by the epoche in a way that further
restricts the ability of conventional epistemic categories
to accurately describe the splitting of the Ego.

Due

to the collapse of natural stance categories and the emergence
of transcendental categories, the Ego split--which appears
solely by virtue of the epoche--can accurately be described
only as a 'phenomenological split.'
this category shift more closely.

16
Ibid., p. 36

Let us now examine

SECTION F
THE DUAL STANCES OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Taking all that has been discussed above as groundof
work, we may now critically examine the relationship
the natural stance to the transcendental stance.

From

the natural stance I, this man among others, live in the
world of spatio-temporally located objects.

We have seen

that this world of our everyday life, though obvious,
suffers a nagging lack of certitude.

This lack of absolute

certitude (of the sort only a philosopher would demand)
was the motivation of Descartes and Husserl alike.

The

both
search for that which cannot possibly be doubted led
inward:

into one's own subjectivity.

By performing the

'
epoche, however, Husserl made a "transcendental turn"
which Descartes failed to make.

Having missed the entrance

to transcendental subjectivity, Descartes remained in
the natural stance, believing the apodictic Ego--one's
of
innermost subjectivity--would be "a little tag-end
the world"

2

which remains as the only unquestionable portion

of the world. He intended to use this piece of apodictic
the
evidence as an axiom from which to infer the rest of

Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 23.
'
2
Ibid., p. 24
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We have seen that Descartes found it necessary

world.

to solicit the aid of supernatural personages to sustain
this view.

But more importantly for the present topic,

the differnces in stance radically alter the categories
through which the world is conceived.
As is well known, Descartes expressed his own indubitability as cogito ergo sum--"I think, therefore I am."
The word 'cogito' is the key term here.

It is through

the cogito that the world is revealed--to "know" in the
familiar sense of the term requires a cogito by definition.
This cogito (or more precisely, a stream of flowingly
unified cogitationes) is our point of existence in the
world.

This stream of cogitationes is revealed by natural

reflection (or psychological reflection which has the
same assumptive base but is more deliberate) as the psyche.
As we have often said, this natural stance is based
upon the inferred validity of harmonious presentations,
thus lacking the apodicticity demanded by a radical philosopher.

Let us, for the moment, examine the ramifications

of assuming the substantial validity of the harmoniously
presented world.

While identifying with the stream of

thought (cogito) through which the actually existing world
(cogitatum) is revealed, we are fully immersed in the
midst of natural world-experience (cogito-cogitatum).
. . .when consciously awake, I find myself at all
times, and without my ever being able to change this,
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set in relation to a world which, through its constant
changes, remains one and ever the same. It is coqtinually
"present" for me, and I myself am a member of it.J
We must bear in mind that this entire natural world
is a world of experienced presentations which include
4
as horizon to the actual "field of perception" an ".

.empty

mist of dim indeterminacy [which] gets studded over with
intuitive possibilities or presumptions."5

These present-

ations exist in the form of cognizable qualities:
can be no qualityless presentations.

there

The distinction

between the transcendental and the natural stance is in
the interpreted meaning values of these presentations.
By presupposing the validity of the flowing cogitationes
as his human psyche, Descartes placed himself squarely
in the natural standpoint of naive acceptance.

His presup-

position of the scholastic doctrine relating qualities
6
to substance had inclined him to assume the substantiality
of world-presentations.

The further acceptance of C:41i1eo's

isolation of those presentations which appear through
the mode exhibiting the quality of extension made the
abstraction of distinct realms involuntary.

If it is

accepted that qualities are indicative of an underlying
substance then the harmonious presentation of qualities
3Husserl, Ideas, pp. 92-93
4

Ibid., p. 91

5
Ibid., p. 92.
6Descartes, Philosophical Works 1:240.
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must be assumed as substantial.

If it is further accepted

that those presentations with the mode of extension constitute
a closed realm of nature, then it only follows that presentations with the mode of non-extension are indicative of
a substance totally distinct from that of corporeal nature.
The assigning of distinct substantiality to particular
strata of presentation (which are segregated according
to the modes of cognizable qualities or attributes) is the
move Husserl felt to be an abstraction. A rough analogy
would be considering steam and ice to be indicative of
totally distinct substances due to the obvious variance
in their attributes.

Though the isolation of one mode

of appearance may be beneficial in certain cases, an overall
inquiry into reality must not lose sight of the fact that
both of these modes of appearance are but modes of the
one category 'water.' Even so, we may interpret Husserl
as holding that the modes of extension and non-extension
are but varying modes of the one category 'mere-phenomenon.'
This change of interpretation (or shifting of stance)
is a product of the transcendental reduction or epoche.
The implications of this reduction (which we have seen
to be the move from strongly held beliefs based upon the
rote interpretation of harmonious presentations to pure
apodicticity) are subtle yet profound:

subtle because
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the presentations themselves do not change, profound because
the change in meaning-value alters the categories of perceived
reality.

From the phenomenological stance both stances

can be accounted fkor but while in the natural stance,
the transcendental Olewpoint is unimaginable.
From the natural standpoint nothing can be seen except
the natural world. So long as the possibility of
the phenomenological standpoint was not grasped, and
the method of relating the objectivities which emerge
therewith to a primordial form of apprehension had
not been devised, the phenomenological world must
needs hive remained unknown, and indeed barely divined
at all.
From the viewpoint of this "primordial form of apprehension," it is seen that the Cartesian categories refer
to abstracta rather than reality.
role in Husserl's phenomenology.

As such they find no
And because the Cattesian

categories fall before the reduction of the epoche, the
concepts implied by their acceptance do not arise in the
transcendental realm.
The soul. . .is the residuum of a previous abstraction
of the pure physical body, and according to this abstraction, at least apparently, is a complement of this
body. But this abstraction (4nd we must not overlook
this) occurs not in the epoche but in the natural
scientist's or psychologist's way of looking at things,
on the natural ground of the world as pregiven and
taken for granted. , . . a pure soul has no meaning
at all in the epoche, unless it is as a "soul" in
"brackets", i • e •J1 as mere "phenomenon" no less than
the living body.-

7
Husserl, Ideas, p. 103.
8Idem, Crisis, pp. 79-80.

Thus from the transcendental stance, the naive segments
into which Descartes severed reality are reduced to the
one category 'mere-phenomenon.'

When examining conscious-

ness the categories 'physical' and 'non-physical' no longer
apply.

Instead, far more radical categories emerge.

One's own consciousness--his indubitable subjectivity--is
no longer interpreted as a particular realm given through
presentations.

Instead, it is the medium of access to

all that is presented, no matter what the mode.

The pheno-

menological categories come into form as the intentional
nature of consciousness is taken into account; the perceived
as one category and the medium through which the perceived
exists as perceived as the other category.
come forth as we ".

These categories

.wait, in pure surrender, on what

is essentially given."9

9
Idem, Ideas, p. 240.

SECTION G
THE CATEGORIES OF NOESIS AND NOEMA
When the epoche is performed, the everyday world
(in all of its modalities) continues to be presented as
before.

But now the scrutiny of the meditating philosopher

is reflectively focused upon the "concrete fullness and
entirety"1 of experience itself.

The radically investi-

gating philosopher is thus placed on the ground of an
apodictic realm of inquiry-- a realm "that would exist
2
even though this world were non-existent."

This realm--the

interior of conscious experience in its full plenitude--is
precisely the primordial given which makes any decision
concerning being possible.

3

By non-positionally and non-involvedly observing
the intentional flow of the stream of conscious experience,
the meditating philosopher creates a reflective space
(a "universe of absolute freedom from prejudice") from
which a "universal criticism of consciousness" can be undertaken.

It is from this unique vantage point that Husserl

intended to carry out the central task of his phenomenology;

1Husserl, Ideas, pp. 104-105.
2
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p• 3.
3
Ibid., p. 19
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it is this that provides the underlying unity of the various
directions of his works.

This task was expressed in the

Ideas as the attempt to find "the true meaning of an objective
being that is subjectively knowable."4

In the Cartesian

Meditations this was referred to as the search for "apodictically certain ways by which, within his own pure inward5
ness, an Objective [obiekt] outwardness can be deduced."
In the Crisis the goal is a "theory of how the ego, in
the intentionality of its reason (through acts of reason)
brings about objective knowledge."6
The motivating question resulting from the epoche
thus concerns the relationship between an act of perception
on the subjective side, and the object perceived (or intended)
on the objective side.

The intentionality of conscious-

ness, after all, requires both.

As we pursue the inten-

tional connection between the act of consciousness and
the actually existing object perceived, the new radical
categories of conscious experience are necessitated.
. . .In experience the intention is given with its
intentional object, which as such belongs inseparably
to it, thus really (reell) within it. What the experience
intends, presents, etc., is and remains with it, whether
the corresponding 'real object" (wirkliche Objekt)
exists in reality or not, or has been anihilated in
the interval, and so forth.

4Idem, Ideas, p. 13.
5Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p• 3.
6Idem, Crisis, p. 83.
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But if we try in this way to separate the real
object (in the case of outer perception the perceived
thing of nature) from the intentional object, placing
the latter as "immanent" to perception within experience
as a real factor (reell), we are beset by the difficulty
that now two realities mustconfront each other, whereas
-5T-these is present and possible. I perceive
only one (
the tETT1g, the object of nature, the tree there in the
garden; that and nothing else is the real object of the
perceiving "intention." A second immanent tree, or even
an "inner image" of the real tree that stands out there
before me, is nowise given, and to suppose such a thing
by way of assumption leads only to absurdity.'
It is obvious that radical categories are necessitated
by the intentional connectedness of my experience of the
tree and the objectively existing tree because to "ascribtel
a representative function to perception, and consequently
to every intentional experience" produces an infinite
8
regress. The method of gaining access to these categories
is found in the phenomenological method itself.

As we

know, the phenomenological epoche reduced the entire world
(in all of its modalities) to mere phenomenon.

Through

this reduction,
. . .we (or, to speak more precisely, what I, the
one who is meditating) acquire. . . is my pure living,
with all the pure subjective processes making this
up, and everything meant in them, purely as meant
in them: the universe of "phenomena" in thg (particular
and also the wider) phenomenological sense.'
This realm of my pure subjective processes (which include
within them their meaning), we have seen, possesses the
apodictic certitude demanded by a radical philosopher.

7
Idem, Ideas, pp. 242-243.
8
Ibid., p. 243.

(Brackets mine).

9Idem, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 20-21.
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Descartes had assumed that once this apodicticity
was found, it could be used as a basis from which to logically
deduce the rest of the world.

Husserl, however, rejected

even this presupposition, thus marking another split from
mathematized ways of knowing.

Instead, he opted to stick

to what is apodictically given.
Thus no attempt is made to carry out systematically
the transcendental knowledge that can be obtained
through logical deduction. Here we have one difference
(though not the only one) between the whole manner
of this new a priori science and that of the mathematical disciplines. These are "deductive" sciences,
and that means that in their scientifically theoretical
mode of development mediate deductive knowledge plays
an incomparably greater part than the immediate axiomatic
knowledge upon which all deductions are oased. An
infinitude of deductions rests upon a very few axioms.
But in the transcendental sphere we have an infinitude of knowledge previous to all deduction, knowledge
whose mediated connexions (those of intentional implication) have nothing to do with deduction, and being
entirely intuitive prove refractory to every me4Rdically devised scheme of constructive symbolism.'
Husserl's phenomenological method consists of observing
and describing--but not participating in--acts of conscious
experience in their concrete fullness.

What is given

is to be taken purely as given, and all deductive interpretation and symbolism are to be avoided.

What is apodic-

tically given, purely as it is given, is the entire sphere
of investigation for transcendental phenomenology.

Taken

in this manner, what is given in pure immediate experience,
in its concrete fullness, may for the first time (by virtue
of the epoche) be examined apart from the "conceptual

10
Idem, Ideas, o. 6.

de
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11
created and methodogenicaly imposed
superstructur:es"
by the exacting mathematical sciences.

It is within this

newly opened field of immanence that phenomenology begins
its investigation.
Being restricted to what is apodictically given,
the meditating philosopher is not interested in the objectively
existing tree outside the window, but with
what remains over as phenomenological residuum. . .
and what. . .should count as a real (reelles) integral
part of the
re experience, and what should not be
so regarded.
Husserl believed that in extracting what was purely
given, we would no longer be concerned with the psychological
act of an ego and its connection with an objectively existing
thing13, which was Descartes' concern.

Instead we would

find the experienced world purely as experienced.

And

my pure immediate experience of a tree is quite different
from the objectively existing tree.

The epoche has shown

us that it is from the continued harmonious stream of
apodictic tree-experience that we come to know of an obviously
exisLing factual tree.

The phenomenological approach

entails that we examine this immediate apodictic experience
to find what it reveals to us about its essential structure.
Its immediate connections and structures must then be
traced to discover how it relates to the objective world.

11
Idem, Crisis, p. 216. (see also Cartesian Meditations,
pp. 7-8
12
Idem, Ideas, p. 260.
13Idem, Ideas, p. 108.
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When the tree-experience is passively observed in
its concrete givenness, we find that it conforms to the
basic intentional structure of all conscious phenomena:
there is an act and what the act refers to (or its "meaning").
The act, however, is not itself the broad act of an ego,
nor is its meaning an objectively existing thing.

Rather,

the pure act and its meaning (as given in the immediate
experience) form the bi-polar structure of a pure phenomenon.
The act, purely as given in its immediacy, is termed the
'Noesis.'

The pure immediate meaning of the noesis (its

referent) is called the 'Noema.'
.• .when phenomenological reduction is consistently
executed, there is left us, on the noetic side, the
openly endless life of pure consciousness and, as
its correlate on the noematic side, the meant world,
purely as meant.
The true meaning of the noesis and noema can only
be reached through the epoche. It is the noetic and noematic
poles of an immediate conscious experience--as experienced-with which we are concerned.

The distinction between

the thing as experienced through the epoche and the thing
as an objective member of the natural world is critical.
The tree plain and simple, the thing in nature, is
as different as it can be from this perceived tree
as such, which as perceptual meaning belongs to the
perception, and that inseparably. The tree plain
and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its
chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning--the
meaning of this perception, something that belongs

14Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 37.
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necessarily to its essence--cannot burn away; it has
no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.
Whatever in purely immanent and reduced form is
peculiar to the experience, and cannot be thought
away from it, as it is in itself, and in its eidetic
setting passes eo i so into the Eidos, is separated
ysics, and not less from all
from all Nature and
abysses; and even this image,
veritable
by
psychology
being naturalisUc, is not strong enough to indicate
the difference.'"

15
Idem, Ideas, p. 240.

SECTION H
•

THE NOEMATIC POLE OF PHENOMENA
To simplify our discussion of the concepts of noesis
and noema, we shall begin by isolating the noematic pole
of phenomena.

The noema, as we have said, is the 'meaning'

usness
referred to by--or contained within--the act of conscio
(we shall take perceptual acts for our examinaton, but
s,
the same will hold true for all acts of consciousnes
1
such as recollection, fancy, etc. ). When I perceive
, the
a solid geometrical figure from the natural stance
y
reduction of the epoche will bring before radical scrutin
the pure, immediate, apodictically given experience of
the figure as experienced in its immediacy.

That is,

meditating
through radical reflection and abstention, ". . .the
ego can, penetrate into the intentional constituents of
2
of
experiential phenomena themselves. • • ." In the case
the geometrical figure, the epoche will effect a shift
lying
of attention from the full many-sided factual object
immediately
in its particular location to what is actually and
experienced:

two vertical faces which join to form a

tal
corner and, extending above them, a portion of a horizon

1
Husserl, Ideas, pp. 106-107.
2
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, P. 79.
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face which fades into indeterminancy.

This is the noema,

which is the apodictically experienced referent of the
immediate conscious act.
Should I move over a few feet, such that I now observe
the geometrical figure from a different angle, the figure
will remain--from the natural stance--the identically
same unitary figure which I can observe from this vantage
point or from any number of other possible perspectives.
But from the transcendental stance of the epoche, each
variation in perspective, however slight, is associated
with a new and unique noema.
To understand the relationship of a particular noema
to the factually existing geometrical figure, we must
first examine the role of the noema in an active consciousness.

Only in its activity can the essential features

of intentional consciousness (the only kind of consciousness) be derived.

We shall see that Husserl uses these

features to attempt to collapse the subject-object dualism
which remained when the Cartesian dualism of physical
and non-physical was collapsed.
The "primal form" of consciousness, according to
3
Husserl, is 'synthesis' .

Only through an understanding

of synthesis can we attempt to explicate the intentional
connectedness of the act of perception and the actually
existing perceived object.
3
Ibid,, p. 39.
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Only elucidation of the peculiarity we call synthesis
makes fruitful the exhibition of the cogito (the intentional subjective process) as consciousness-of--that
is to say, Franz Bretano's significant discovery that
"intentionality" is the fundamental characteristic
of "psychic phenomena"--and actually lays open the
method for a descriptive transcendental-philosophical
theory of consciousness (and naturally also for a
corresponding psychological theory).
Consciousness, as we know, consists of a series of intentional acts.

But due to synthesis, ". . .transcendental

subjectivity is not a chaos of intentional experiences,
but . . .a unity. . • •n 5 The objective sense is constituted
from out of subjectivity through synthesis, and we shall
see momentarily that synthesis is likewise tied intimately
with time consciousness.

But let us now examine the role

of synthesis in constituting factual objects from the
noematic stream.
It is through the dynamic function of synthesis
that identity (on the noetic as well as the noematic side)
is perceived within the multiplicity of experience.

Even

the 'self-ness' of factual objects, according to Husserl,
must be extracted from the stream of phenomena by synthesis.
The "object" of consciousness, the object as having
identity "with itself" during the flowing subjective
process, does not come into the process from outside;
on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the
subjective process itself--and thus as a- , "intentional
effect" produced by the synthesis of consciousness.

4
Ibid., p. 41.
-Idem, "Paris Lectures," pp. 55-56.
6Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 42.
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This leads us to a seeming paradox:

the noematic stream

belongs to my pure experience, yet this same stream of
manifold appearances bear within themselves 'that

•

which is' as their 'object-pole.'"7

Closer examination

of this synthetic constitution will bring us to Husserl's
path out of the paradox.
As a series of distinct noema passes, the noema
are not random but are tied together by an essential relatedness.

To the extent that the flowing noemata are harmonious,

they bear within themselves the commonality of being appearances of one identical real object. Within each of the
various noema there lies a
. . .central nucleus which at first obtrudes itself
prominently, the "meant (vermeinte) objectivity as
such," the objective in invgrted commas as the phenomenological reduction demands.0
Each noema, as pure immediate 'meaning' of a subjective
act--i.e., as what is actually an3 apodictically experienced
by the 'mediate act of consciousness--refers itself to
something more: to an objectivity.

We may take this relation-

ship to be between what is apodictically experienced and
the factual object which claims existence status through
the harmonious flow of noemata.
For example, if I take the perceiving of this die
as the theme for my description, I see in pure reflection
that "this" die is given continuously as an objective

7
Idem, Crisis, p. 170.
8
Idem, Ideas, p. 250.
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unity in a multiform and changeable mutiplicity of
manners of appearing, which belong determinately to
it. These, in their temporal flow, are not an incoherent
sequence of subjective processes. Rather, they flow
away in the unity of a synthesis, such that in them
"one and the same" is intended as appearing. The
one identical die appears, now in "near appearances,"
now in "far appearances": in the changing modes of
the Here and There, over against an always co-intended,
though pertiaps unheeded, absolute Here (in my co-appearing
organism).''
While synthesis performs the task of extracting
patterns of meaning (or poles of 'self-sameness') from
the manifold stream of noemata, it also performs the function
of intending 'non-identity.'
. . .every consciousness in which the non-identical
is intended unitarily (every consciousness of a plurality,
a relational complex, or the like) is ultimately a
synthesis in this sense, constituting its peculiar
cogitatum (the plurality, the relational complex,
or whatever it is) synthetically. . . Even contradictions, imcompatibilities, are productinof "syntheses"
(to be sure, syntheses of another kind).
There is little difficulty in understanding these flowing
noema (with the synthetically appearing patterns of identity
and relational complexes as what is 'meant' in them) to
be the apodictic stream of presentations of the one identical
die, for example.

But complications emerge when we consider

Husserl's claim that we cannot "ascribe a representative
11
function to perception."

This entails that the noemata--in

the flowing multiformity (of actual and possible noema)--do
not represent a factual die that exists 'out there,' but
are inseparably tied to, or better, comprise the factual

9
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 39-40.
10
Ibid., p. 42.
11

Idem, Ideas, p. 243.
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die.

We do not internally experience images of what exists

externally; our experience is immediately of the die there
on the table.

To make the move from the noematic presentation

of the die (this side, from here) to the fullness of the
actually existing real die, we must first examine what
Husserl termed the 'horizon.'
12
is a product
The "intentional horizon of reference"
of synthesis by which the actually given noema presents
possible noemata to which it stands related.

These horizons

are "'predelineated' potentialities" by which "we uncover
the objective sense meant implicitly"13 in the act of
perception.

The horizons are given with the immediate

14
actual noema as a sense of "foreshadowing."

Yet through

this awareness of the non-actually given,
[e]very intentional analysis reaches beyond the immediately
and actually [reell] given events of the immanent
sphere, and in such a way that the analysis discloses
potyRtialities-- which are now given actually [reell].
• •
In this way consciousness synthetically reaches
beyond the apodictically given noema to the fullness of
the harmoniously presented factual entity.
For example: the die leaves open a great variety of
things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is "construed"
in advance as a die, in particular as colored, rough,
and the like, though each of these determinations
always leaves further particulars open. This leaving

12
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 44
13Ibid., p. 45.
14Ibid.
15
Idem, "Paris Lectures," p• 55.
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open, prior to further determinings (which perhaps
never take place), is a moment included in the given
consciousness itself; it is precisely what makes up
the "horizon." u
And again:
When I see a hexahedron I say, in reality and in truth
I see it only from one side. It is nonetheless evident
that what I now experience is in reality more. The
perception includes a non-sensory belief through which
the visible side can be understood to be a mere side
in the first place. But. . . how does it become obvious
that I mean more? It occurs through the transition
to a synthetic sequence of possible perceptions, perceptions
I would have--as indeed I can--were I to walk around
the object.17
Husserl holds that it is through these "sense-fulfilling
syntheses" that consciousness makes the transition from
mere apodictic phenomenon to a world of meaning.18
The horizuns created through synthesis not only
account for the fullness of particular meant entities;
the rest of the factual world is also given horizonally.
The harmonious particularity which I single out through
scrutiny is the focal point of my attention.

This "focal

is girt about with a 'zone' of the marginal; the stream
of experience can never consist wholly of actualities."19
The marginal extends out from what is actually perceived,
through what is "more or less clearly co-present and determinate" to a "dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality.„ 2O Inthis way the
16

Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 45.

17Idem, "Paris Lectures,” P• 55.
18Ibid.
19
Idem, Ideas, 13• 107.
2°Ibid., p. 92.
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•. .mform" of the world as °world" is foretokened.
Moreover, the zone of indeterminancy is infinite.
The misty horizon that canlpever be completely outlined
remains necessarily there.
When we shift from pure apodictic evidence (immediate
noema) to what is synthetically constituted through that
evidence, we find the 'world' thus horizonally intended
as background of each perception of a particular entity.
Also included in the stock of what is given horizonally
with each immediate perception is the potential of memory.
. . .to every perception there always belongs a horizon
of the past, as a potentiality of awakenable recollections; and to every recollection there belongs,
as a horizon, the continuous intervening intentionality
of possible recollections (to be actualized on my
22
initiative, actively), up to the actual Now of perception.
According to this view then, we are given a pure,
immediate, apodictically certain presentation:

the noema.

From the noematic stream (which is neither distinct from
consciousness nor from the factual world) patterns of
harmonious presentations are constituted as self-identities.
Included horizonally in each presentation of a particular
constituted entity is the synthetically given 'non-sensual'
awareness of what is non-actually given but intended.
This synthetic horizon, we have seen, is composed of the
non-actually perceived but potentially perceivable aspects
of a factual object; the margin of surrounding world (actual
and implied), the store of meanings from past experiences

22
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 44-45.
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of the perceived object, and other aspects of our everyday
lived experience which are not included in the raw experience
of the noema.

This synthetic constitution of a horizonally

experienced world applies also to
. . .all and any of the cogitationes in the sense
illustrated by Descartes' use of the term, to all
experiences of thought, feeling and will, except that,. • •
the "directedness towards," the "being turned towards,"
which is the distinctive mark of focal actuality,
does not coincide, as in the favourite because simplist
examples of sensory presentations, with2qingling out
and noting the objects we are aware of.
This transition from what is purely and immediately
experienced, as experienced, to the synthetically constituted
wo:ld of harmoniously presented factual objects, though
an intrinsic craft of consciousness, must be developed.
With good reason it is said that in infancy we had
to learn to see physical things, and that such modes
of consciousness of them had to precede all others
genetically. In "early infancy", then, the field
of perception that gives beforehand does not as yet
contain anything thS4 in a mere look, might be explicated
as a physical thing.
To understand how a conscious act constitutes its object,
we must shift our inquiry to the noetic pole of phenomena.

23
Idem, Ideas, p. 107.
24Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 79.

SECTION I
THE NOETIC/NOEMATIC RELATIONSHIP
In the preceding section we concentrated our examination upon the noematic pole of experience.

We saw that,

through its autochthonous feature of synthesis, consciousness constitutes factual objects as meanings intended
by harmoniously recurring patterns of presentation which
stand forth as 'poles of identity.'

As we now pursue

the intentional cnnection from what is intended back
to the intending act, we must make full use of the epoche.
By means of the epoche the meditating philosopher is able
to reflectively objectify (and thus examine in its fullness) the noetic pole of experience.
To begin to grasp the intentional relation of the
noesis to the noema (and to the factual world), we must
take our start with the temporalities inherent in the
process of synthesis.

By examining the distinction between

'objective' temporality and 'internal' temporality, we
will gain access to Husserl's view of the essentially
non-dualistic (in the substantial sense of the term) relation
of the subject and object.

Rather than there being a

subjective act of consciousness and an objective article
of experience (each having its own autonomous existence
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and being only provisionally related to the other), a
phenomenon exists as a unity with a bi-polar structure:
as in the case of perception, the perceiving (noesis)
and the perceived (noema).
'Phenomenological temporality' is a "general peculiarity of all experiences"1; that is, all experiences are
"temporally ordered, temporaly beginning and ending, simultaneous or successive, within the constant infinite horizon:
immanent time."

2

But phenomenological time belongs exclusively

to the stream of experience of "one pure Ego" (or said
differently, a single stream of experience).

3

And this

must be distinguished from "objective," or "cosmological"
time which can be measured by the movement of the sun,
4
a clock, or other objective means.

As we continue to

discuss these distinct temporalities, we must bear in
mind that the factual world--the world of cosmic time--is
the synthetically constituted meaning of the noematic
pole of phenomena.
The phenomenological or internal temporality is
the order of the noetic pole.

The epoche has detached

the meditating Ego from the acceptance of the temporal

1
Husserl, Ideas, p. 215.
2Idem, Cartesian Meditations,
F. 43.
3Idem, Ideas, p. 215.
4Ibid.

6

stream in which the factual object is located (though
it continues to appear), leaving the temporal stream of
experience open to scrutiny.'
If we consider the fundamental form of synthesis,
namely identification, we encounter it first of all
as an all-ruling, passively flowing synthesis, in
the form of the continuous consciousness of internal
time. Every subjective process has its internal
temporality. If it is a conscious process in which
(as in the perception of the die) a worldly Object
appears as cogitatum, then we have to distinguish
the Objective temporality that appears (for example:
the temporality of thiz die) from the "internal"
temporality of the appearing (for example: that
of die-perceiving). This appearing "flows away"
with its temporal extents and phases, which, for
their part, are continually changing appearances
of the one identical die. Their unity is a unity
of synthesis: not merely a continuous connectedness of cogitationes (as it were, a being stuck to
one another externally), but a connectedness thatmakes the unity of one consciousness, in which the
unity of an internal objectivity, as "the same" objectivity belonging to multiple modes of appearance,
becomes "constituted." The existence of a world and,
accordingly, the existence,of this die are "parenthesized"
in consequence of my epoche; but the one identical,
appearing die (as appearing) is continuously "immanent"
in the flowing consciousness, descriptively "4n" it;
as is likewise the attribute "one identical,"
To discern the relatedness of these two temporalities,
we must be fully apprised of the role of synthesis in
constituting a temporal unity.

The sequential constitution

of perceived identities from the harmonious stream of
noemata synthetically forms a horizonally given unitary
temporality:

i.e., objective or cosmic time.

Likewise,

the individual act of perception is sequentially located

5
Ibid.
6
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 41-42.
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amidst a stream of noeses.

The many individual noeses

are synthetically merged into one encompassing noesis,
thus forming a unitary consciousness composed of many
conscious acts which are distributed along and comprise
a temporal stream.
Adopting a suitable reflective standpoint, we are
able to note the mode of conscious presentation of
the stretches of experience which belong to the different
sections of experienced duration, and subsequently
to state that the whole consciousness which constitutes
this unity of duration is continuously compounded out
of sections in which the sections of duration as we
experience them are constituted; and that the noeses,
therefore, do not only unite together, but constitute
one noesis with one noema (that of the filled duration
of experience), which is grounded in the noemata of the
united noeses. And what holds good for a single experience,
holds good also for the whole stream of experience.
Foreign to each other as experiences may essentially be,
they constitute themselves collectively into one tim5stream, as members of the one phenomenological time.
Due to synthesis, then, the series of noeses and
the correlate series of noemata are constituted as a unitary
stream of conscious acts and its correlate, a unitary
world of experience.

These two synthetic streams (the

two poles of phenomena, each with its distinct temporality)
are, of course, intentionally related and essentially
8
co-dependent.
. . .we have, in the Cartesian manner of speaking,
the three headings ego-cogitatio-cogitata: the egopole (and what is peculiar to its identity), the subjective, as appearance tied together synthetically, and
the object-poles. These are different directions
7
Idem, Ideas, p. 308
8We
shall take up the Ego as pole of identity in
the following section.
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our analyses can take, and to them correspond different
aspects of the general notion of intentionality:
direction toward something, appearance of something,
and something, an objective something, as the unity
in its appearances toward which the intention of the
ego-pole, through these appearances, is .ji-ected. . 9
these headings are inseparable from 're another. . .
A factuA object is synthetically constituted from
tha stream of noemata as a self-identical thing to which
each of the individual noemata refers.

As referent of

the noematic stream, this object is said to be the 'meaning'
of that stream.

It is due to the noetic pc'e (the pole

of internal temporality) that the factual world (the world
of objective temporality) exists as the meant referent
of the noematic pole.
Like perception, every intentional experience--and
this is indeed the fundamental mark of all intentionality-has its "intentional object," i.e., its objective
meaning. Or to repeat the same in other words: To
have a meaning, or to have something "in mind," is
the cardinal feature of all consciousness, that on
account of t4hich it is not only experience generaly
10
but meaningful, "noetic."
It is the intrinsic bond between the 'meaning' and
the 'meant' that we are attempting to uncover as we explore
Husserl's view of the noetic/noematic relationship.

As

we trace the development from what is given purely as
given to what the pure presentations intend, we find that
we are uncovering the noetic/noematic relationship.

The

'intendings' of the noeses are creatively associated with

9
Husserl, Crisis, p. 171
10
Idem, Ideas, p. 241.

the synthetically given horizon of the noemata in such
a way that the constitution of real objects (which are
given as being outside of, or transcendent to, consciousness)
is in fact inseparable from the subjectivity of consciousness.
. . .external experience alone can verify objects
of external experience, though, to be sure, it does
so only as long as the (passively or actively) continuing
experience has the form of a harmonious synthesis.
That the being of the world "transcends" consciousness in
this fashion (even with respect to the evidence in
which the world presents itself), and that it necessarily
remains transcendent, in no wise alters the fact that
it is conscious life alone, wherein everything transcendent becomes constituted, as inseparable from consciousness, and which specifically, as world-consciousness,
bears within itself inseparably the sensii world --and
indeed: "this actually existing" world.
Through the intendings of the noeses, the patterns
immanent in the synthetically linked noemata take on the
meaning of presentations of an object which lies 'out
there'-- an object which transcends consciousness through
its horizonally given attributes.

Synthesis does not

and cannot occur, however, unless the noematic presentations
occur in syntactically ordered patterns.
. . .the exhibitings must occur in a certain systematic
order; it is in this way that they are indicated in
advance, inirpectation, in the course of a harmonious
perception.
The structure that synthetic constitution must follow
is determined by what Husserl termed 'eidetic laws.'
This conformity of synthesis to prescribed lines of development provides the unity of an objective sense to both
11Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 62.
12Idem, Crisis, pp. 161-162.
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the noetic and noematic poles of the "flux of intentional
14
13
rules dictate
These "essentially necessary"
synthesis."
the form of all aspects of synthetic constitution.
Transcendental subjectivity is not a chaos of intentional
processes. Moreover, it is not a chaos of types of
constitution, each organized in itself by its relation
to a kind or a form of intentional objects. In other
words: The allness of objects and types of objects
conceivable for me--transcendentally speaking: for
me as transcendental ego--is no chaos; and correlatively
the allness of the types of the infinite multiplicities,
the types corresponding to types of objects, is not
a chaos either: noetically and noematically those
multiplicities always belong together, in respect
of their possible synthesis.
That indicates in advance a universal constitutive
synthesis, in which all syntheses function together
in a definitely ordered manner and in which therefore
all actual and possible objectivities (as actual and
possible for the transcendental ego), and correlatively
all actual and possRle modes of consciousness of
them, are embraced.
The flow of phenomena prior to any synthetic consti„16
tution is "truly the realm of a Heraclitean flux.
To this aspect of subjectivity, Husserl applied a statement
04.:
made by Heraclitus about the 4,

'You will never find

the boundaries of the soul, even if you follow every road;
so deep is the ground.”

17

It is transcendental constitution

18
from out
which is the "original formation of meaning"
of this boundless flux.

Only due to the regularity created

13
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, P. 49
141 bid.
15Ibid., p. 54.
16Ibid., p. 49
17
Idem, Crisis, p. 170.
18Ibid., p. 167
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by a "universal conformity to laws of structure on the
part of conscious life" do truth and actuality exist as
modes of sense for us.19

But it is not just that synthetic

constitution occurs along lines dictated by a priori laws,
but also that the lines of constitution (which provide
the first pieces of meaning--or order--from the flux of
pre-synthetic phenomena) form the a priori laws which
the continuously flowing constitution (noetic and noematic)
must follow.
Reason is not an accidental de facto ability, not
a title for possible accidental matters of fact, but
rather a title for an all-embracing necessary strucKural
form belonging to all transcendental subjectivity."'
Taking what we have seen thus far concerning the
rule conformity of synthetic constitution, and the bipolar intentionality of phenomena, we may now begin to
inquire into Husserl's conception of the ego as monad
of identity.

19
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 59.
20Ibid., p. 57.

SECTION J
THE NATURAL EGO
Acts of consciousness do not occur one at a time
in simple linear procession, but in intricate act complexes.
To over-simplify:

When I perceive a hammer, the straight-

forward act of hammer perceiving is accompanied by (in
varying degrees of vagueness or evidentness) the remembrances
of past hammer perceptions and usages, and the potentials
thus made inherent in this hammer perception.

This is

possible, in Husserl's theory, due to the formation of
'noetic layers.' These are layers of noetic acts which
are "superimposed one on the other. .

[as] in the case

of acts of thought, feeling, and will."
More precisely, the current act of hammer perception
forms what may be described "metaphorically"2 as a "beam
of attention"

3

which, enroute to its intended object,

passes through a retinue of noetic layers.

Thus the present

attentional ray
. . .passes now through this, now through that noetic
layer, or (as in the case, for instance, of memories)

1
Husserl, Ideas, p. 260. (Brackets mine).
2Ibid., p. 246.
3Ibid., p. 247.
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right through this or that intercalated stratum, sometimes
directly, sometimes as reflected. Within the total
given field of potential noeses or of noetic objects,
we glance now at some whole, say the tree which is
perceptually present, now at this or that part and
phase of the same; then again at a thing standing
close by, or at some complex organization and process.
Suddenly we direct our glance towards some object
of recollection which chances to occur to us. Our
glance, instead of passing through the noeses of perception,
which in a continuous and unitary way, though variously
articulated, constitute for us the steadily appearing
world of things, goes through a noesis of remembrance
into a world of memory, moves about in the latter,
wandering here and there, passes on to memories of 4
other levels, or into worlds of fancy, and so forth.
For the present topic, our concern must be to delimit
5
within these varying "intentional stratum" the one identical
ego; in short, to discover the relation of these multiple
intentional layers to 'I who am perceiving this tree and
having these memories.'

According to Husserl, the metapho-

rical beam of attention "gives itself out as radiating
from the Pure Ego and terminating in the objective,. .
[yet is] not separate from the Ego, but itself is and
remains personal."6 The difficulty stems from the vast
number of overlapping, superimposed, and interpenetrating
noetic acts, each with a distinct 'shaft of attention.'
The very intentionality of a conscious act (a cogito)
demands the existence of both an object and an ego (as
subject).

The ego implied by the act is also partially

defined by the act.

4Ibid.
5Ibid.
6
Ibid., p. 249. (Brackets mine)
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To the cogito itself belongs an immanent "glancingtowards" the object, a directedness which from another
side springs forth from the "Ego," which can therefore
never be absent. This glancing of the Ego towards
something is in harmony with the act involved, perceptive
in perception, fanciful in fancy,7approving in approval,
volitional in will, and so forth.
We have seen that the ego (who has direct evidence
of himself) is present in each and every cogito.

As such,

he experiences himself in the flow of the acts in which
his existence is given.

But he also experiences himself

as the same identical ego through all of these acts--in
other words, as a monad of identity.
The ego grasps himself not only as a flowing life
but also as I, who live this and that subjective process,
whg live through this and that cogito, as the same
I.
Maintaining the stance of the epoche (the viewpoint
of the transcendental Ego), we begin the task of explicating
the development of this unitary identity that runs through
all of the noetic acts.

In each act, we have seen, a

metaphorical 'beam of attention' exists between the noesis
and its noema.

This 'beam' is personal; that is, it conveys

subjective identity within itself.

Throughout a continuous

stream of noeses these 'beams' give themselves as issuing
from one sustained identity.

Our attempt to explain this

leads us once again to examine synthesis and constitution,
but now as they form a pole of self-identity in the noetic
side of phenomena.

7
Ibid., p. 109.
8
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 66.
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Since we were busied up to now with the intentional
relation of consciousness to object, cogito to cogitatum,
only that synthesis stood out for us which "polarizes"
the multiplicities of actual and possible consciousness toward identical objects, accordingly in relation
to objects as poles, synthetic unities. Now we encounter
a second polarization, a second kind of synthesis,
which embraces all particular multiplicities of cogitationes collectively and in its own manner, namely
as belonging to the identical Ego, who, as the active
and affected subject of consciousness, lives in all
processes of consciousness9and is related, through
them, to all object-poles.
Through synthesis the harmoniousness of a series
of presentations is constituted as a meant unity or order.
This process is governed by eidetic laws.

But we have

seen (from the transcendental stance) that the law which
governs synthetic constitution is itself brought forth
from the pre-synthetic flux by constitution.

Thus synthetic

constitution is not so much governed by a priori laws
of causality as it is autonomous.
The eidetic laws of compossibility (rules that
govern simultaneous or successive existence and possible
existence together, in the fact) are laws of causality
in a maximally broad sense--laws for an If and Then.
Yet it is better to avoid here the expression causality,
which is laden with prejudices (deriving from naturalism),
nd to speak of motivation in the transcendental sphere. .
The on-going process by which order is built- up
(along 'motivational' lines) into a synthetically constituted
unity (one with 'itself-ness') is termed 'genesis.' Husserl
distinguishes two types of genesis:

active anG passive.

Active genesis is performed by the ego in the pre-given
world.

9
Ibid.
10
Ibid., p. 75.

10
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ly
In active genesis the Ego functions as productive
that
constitutive, by means of subjective processes
all
are specifically acts of the Ego. Here belong
broad
the works of practical reason, in a maximally
ical.
sense. In this sense even logical reason is pract
realm
The characteristic feature (in the case of the
--whose
of logos) is that Ego-acts, pooled in a sociality
transcendental sense, to be sure, we have not yet
brought to light--, become combined in a manifold,
of
specifically active synthesis and, on the basis
that
ess
iousn
consc
of
modes
(in
objects already given
.
nally
origi
ts
objec
new
itute
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give beforehand),
as
ess
iousn
consc
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elves
thems
present
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11
products.
tion
But for our present inquiry, it is the presupposi
of active genesis that is of interest.

For active genesis

genesis
(which is performed by the ego) to occur, a passive
is needed.
pposes,
. . .anything built by activity necessarily presu
hing
as the lowest level, a passivity that gives somet
beforehand; and, when we trace anything built actively,
The
we run into constitution by passive generation.
an
as
"ready-made" object that confronts us in life
existent mere physical thing (when we disregard all
the "spiritual" or "cultural" characteristics that
make it knowable as, for example, a hammer, a table,
an aesthetic creation) is given, with the originality
of the "it Welf", in the synthesis of a passive
experience.
It is passive genesis which, following the eidetic
hetic
law of constitution, brings forth from the pre-synt
flux, the raw material of order and unity (the qualities
ltaneity',
of 'it itseltness', 'similarity', 'difference', 'simu
and 'sequence') on which the active geneses of the natural
life are based.

Husserl also refers to the process of

11
Ibid., p. 77
12
Ibid., p. 78
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passive genesis as "association", which is "a matter of
13 Because association has the bi-polar
intentionality."
form of intentionality, passive genesis of the world infers,
as its correlate, the oassive genesis of the ego.

According

a
to Husserl, the elucidation of passive genesis is the
14
only access to a comprehension of the ego.

Not only

is it ". . .owing to an essentially necessary genesis
that I, the ego, can Experience a physical thing and do
. 15
but it is also the "universal genetic
so at first glance ,
form that makes the concrete ego

the monad) possible

16
as a unity."
17
The essential form of genesis is temporality.
We have seen that constitution of the noetic and noematic
poles of phenomena sets up distinct 'internal' and 'objective'
temporal streams.

It is through temporal flow that persisting

unity is ". . .built up in a continual,passive and completely
universal genesis, which, as a matter of essential necessity,
18
embraces everything new."

Thus, self-explication reveals

the ego's "structural form"

to be "temporal within an

19
all-embracing time" --a temporal structure related to

13Ibid., p. 80.
14Ibid., p. 81.
15Ibid., P. 79 16Ibid., p. 76.
17Ibid., p. 81.
18Ibid., p. 81.
19Ibid., p. 103.
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a history of past constructions. As such the ego, through
passive generation across the stream of internal temporality
(which is itself generated from the flow of noetic acts),
'builds up' an identity.

The concrete ego, however, is not

"an empty pole of identity"

20 serving as "center" for the

stream of noetic acts.
Rather, according to a law of "transcendental generation",
with every act emanating from him and having a new 21
objective sense, he acquires a new abiding property.
In other words, through self-experience, the ego
is directly accessible to himself, but only in the strict
living present (expressed as ego-cogito).

What is immed-

iately available is the present act, whicn we have seen
to contain the quality of subjective identity.

But due

to passive genesis, the stream of noetic acts blend in
such a manner that a monad of subjective identity is synthetically referred to.

The present noetic act is given

to reflection with a constituted horizon which is
. .strictly non-experienced but necessarily alsomeant. To it belongs not only the ego's past, most
of which is completely obscure, but also his transcendental abjAities and his habitual peculiarities at
the time.
This ego, given immediately as the identity pole
of each new act, constitutes himself (by active generation)
as the one concrete ego whose own past is given thus.

20
Ibid., p. 66
.
21Ibid.
22
Ibid., p. 23.
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.by his own active generating, the Ego constitutes
.
himself as identical substrate of E9o- roperties
he constitutes himself also as a "fixed and al90 ng"
Rersonal Ego--in a maximally broad sense. . ."
Because of this self-constitution as a concrete, temporally
enduring ego, he positions his self-identification in
the synthetically constituted temporal stream of 'his'
subjective acts.
Let us here point out only what is most important,
the most general aspect of the ego's form, namely,
the peculiar temporalization by which it becomes an
enduring ego, constituting itself in its time-modalities:
the same ego, now actualy present, is in a sense,
in every part that belongs to it, another--i.e., as
that which was and thus is not now--and yet, in the
continuity of its time it is one and the same, which
is and was and has its future before it. The ego which
is present now, thus temporalized, has contact with
its past ego, even though the latter is precisely
no longer present: it can have . A dialogue with it
and criticize it, as can others. -f
But even though this temporal horizon is constituted
as my concrete lived identity (which has its existence
on the same level as the factual world of my everyday
25
life) , there always remains the non-synthetic, non-genetically built up identity which can be experienced when
I perceive my ego purely as subjective identity of the
immediate conscious act.

23
Ibid., p. 67.
24

Idem, Crisis, p. 172.

25Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 68.
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. . .when explicating the horizon of being that is
included in my own essence, one af the first things
I run into is my immanent temporality and, with it,
my existence in the form of an open infiniteness,
that of a stream of subjective processes, and in the
form of all those "ownnesses" of mine that are somehow 26
included in the stream--one of which is my explicating.
According to Husserl, the ego's existence purely as subjective
identity pole of phenomena must be distinguished from
the "ego taken in full concreteness" (which is termed
"monad").

27

The ego can exist as a concrete monad of identity

only when he constitutes himself as including, in his
own being, the full range of noetic horizons.
The Ego can be concrete only in the flowing multiformity
of his intentional life, along with the object meant--and
in some caps constituted as existent for him--in
that life."
We may interpret this distinction to be a matter
of what the ego constitutes as his 'own-ness.'

The subjec-

tivity immanent in what Husserl metaphorically described as
an attentional ray lacks the full concretenesss experienced
in my lived ego; it has the quality of "open infiniteness."
But the ego which constitutes not only the immediate attentional ray, but the entire field of actual and possible noetic
layers (which genetically blend to build up a temporality
given as 'my inwardness') as its own identity perceives
itself as a monad of enduring identity.

28Ibid., p. 102.
27Ibid., pp. 67-68.
28Ibid., p. 68.
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For the non-concrete ego given purely as subjective
identity in an act of consciousness, the world (as object
nf

the act) exists only as accepted.

It is due to "positing

29
(synthetic constitution) that
ana explicating of bging"
the world exists for the ego-pole. This process, through
•
the temporal sequence of acts, sets up a 'habituality'
of position-taking.

It is this habituality (of which

the ego-pole serves as substrate) that has as its correlate
the "abiding existence and being thus" of the object.

30

The world is thus tied to the habitualities and positiontakings of the conscious acts (noeses) for which the nonconcrete ego is given as identity pole.
For the concrete ego, however, the world (whose
"ideality as a synthetic unity belonging to an infinite
system of my potentialities,. . . is still a determining
part of my own concrete being. . .") is "alien" and "external
to my own concrete Ego" (but not at all in the natural
spatial sense).

31

This sets up a paradoxical existence

for the concrete ego. As a concrete ego, I am inseparable
from this external world.
I, the real human being, am a real object like others
in the natural world. I carry out cogitationes, "acts
of consciousness" in both a narrower and a wider sense,

29Ibid., p. 68.
3°Ibid.
31Ibid., p. 106.
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and these acts, as belonging to this Iowan subject,
are events of the same natural world.-"'
But while I exist, in truth, as an object in this world,
I also exist as a subject for the world.

As an ego who

is an object in this world, anything which reflection
reveals as purely my own, I refer to as my psyche.33
We have seen that this is where Descartes made his spurious
division between material man and the psyche, which he
believed to be the soul.

But according to Husserl, the

34
psyche is "part of the phenomenon of man" ; the distinction
of objective world and internal psyche, we can now say,
is a matter of constituted poles of phenomena and their
inherent temporalities.

Because both are synthetic consti-

tutions genetically built up from what is not immediately
and actually but only horizonally given, both transcend
pure consciousness and thus exist in the 'natural world'
(but not in the mathematical sense of Galileo and Descartes).
As a monad of enduring 'self-identity' living in a pregiven world, the paradox arises that my very acts of inwardness are events in the world which is external to me.
The concrete ego has his existence in the world
through 'bodily holding-sway.'

In this manner he continues

to paradoxically experience the objective world subjectively

32
Idem, Ideas, pp. 101-102
33
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 100
34Ibid.
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(or the external world internally).

Holding-sway (or

kinesthesia) is the concrete ego's experience of his physical
body in the world.

It is through kinesthesia that the

concrete ego (the constituted unity enduring as monad
through the temporality of the noetic flow) acts in the
world (the constituted unity enduring through the temporality
of the noematic flow).

This experience of existence in

the world has the form of an internal experience of the
external.
Through bodily "holding-sway" in the form of striking,
lifting, resisting, and the like, I act as ego across
distances, primarily on the corporeal aspects of objects
in the world. . . . all such holding-sway occurs in
modes of "movement," but the "I move" in holding-sway
(I move my hands, touching or pushing something)is
in itself [merely] the spatial movement of a physical
body, which as such could be perceived by everyone.
My body--in particular, say, the bodily part "hand"--moves
in space; [but] the activity of holding-sway, "kinesthesis,":
which is embodied together with the body's movement,
is not itself in space as a spatial movement bypt is
only indirectly colocalized in that movement."
Or again:
The kinestheses are different from the movements of
the living body which exhibit themselves merely as
those of a physical body, yet they are somehow one
with them, belonging to one's own living body with
its two-sided character (tpternal kinetheses, external
physical-real movements).'
For the concrete ego, the body serves as the "organ"37
through which it lives, as monad, in what is for it a

35
Idem, Crisis, p. 217
36Ibid., p. 161.
37Ibid., p. 217
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pre-given world of objects.

We may understand this kines-

thetic sensation of movement about the world of objects
if we recall that an object is synthetically constituted
from the given noema--this side from here (the "from here"
indicating the intentionally required noesis)--and its
full horizon of implied possible noemata, each referring
to the same meant identical object.

The concrete ego,

as we know, is synthetically generated from the given
noesis and its full range of horizonal noeses:

those

in its past and those merely possible.
. . .By free modification of my kinesthesias, particularly those of locomotion, I can change my position
in such a manner that I convert any There into a Here--that
is to say, I could occupy any spatial locus with my
organism. This implies that, perceiving from there,
I should see the same physical things, only in correspondingly different modes of appearance, such as pertain
to my being there. It implies, then, that not only
the systems of appearance that pertain to my current
perceiving "from here", but other quite determinate
systems, corresponding to the change of position that
puts me "there", belong constitutively to each phy§lcal
thing. And the same in the case of every "There."'
But all of this pertains to the concretely experienced
ego of everyday life.

We shall return to this discussion

when we take up the alter ego, but for now let us examine
what Husserl believed to be the role of the transcendental
Ego.

38Idem, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 116-117.

SECTION K
THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO
The notion of an Ego which remains after the reduction
of the epoche is a major theme of Husserl's philosophy.
The development of this key concept reflects the development of his phenomenology as a whole.
Ego, however, is not at all certain.

The nature of this
In his preface to

the Ideas, Husserl states that transcendental subjectivity,
because of its priority over the world of constituted
objects, has an ontological status.
• • .only transcendental subjectivity has ontologically
the meaning of Absolute Being, . . . it only is nonrelative, that is relative to itself; whereas the
real world indeed exists, but in respect of essence
is relative to transcendental subjectivity, and in
such a way that it can have its meaning as existing
(seiende) reality only as the intention#1 meaningproduct of transcendental subjectivity.
But this "ontic meaning" can be meaning only from
the life-world

2 (the world of meaning as experienced by

the concrete ego which, as a synthetic constitution, falls
before the epoche).

Hence the status of that subjectivity

which remains after the epoche must, as we said earlier,
be described as 'phenomeaological' and its radical explication
must follow phenomenological lines. Beginning now with

1Husserl, Ideas, p. 14.
2
Idem, Crisis, p. 218.
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the Logical Investigations and chronologically proceeding
to the Crisis, we shall examine Husserl's conception of
the transcendental Ego as it was developed.
In the Logical Investigations Husserl m:Antained
that there is no ego other than that empirically experienced
as the unity of act complexes ("the name 'phenomenological
ego' was given to the stream of consciousness as such"

3

in the first edition of the above work).
. . .the relation in which experiences are thought
to stand to an experiencing consciousness (or to an
experiencing 'phenomenological ego') points to no
peculiar phenomenological situation. The ego in the
sense of common discourse is an empirical object,
one's own ego as much as someone else's, and each ego
as much as any physical thing, a house or a tree etc.
. . . the ego remains an individual, thing-like object,
which, like all such objects, has phenomenally no
other unity than that given it through its unified
phenomenal proper“es, and which in them has its own
internal make-up...
This 'phenomenal ego' bears remarkable similarity
to the ego synthetically constituted through passive genesis
from the noetic stream and resulting horizons.

If, for

instance, the phenomenal ego of the Logical Investigations
is limited to its phenomenological content, we find that
it
. . .reduces to a unity of consciousness, to a real
experiential complex, which we (i.e. each man for
his own ego) find in part evidentlypresent, and for
the rest postulate on good grounds.-)

3Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans.
J.N. Lindlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 2:541.
4Ibid.
5
Ibid.
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This synthetic constitution of a unity from non-really
given presentations also occurs according to laws which
bear a striking affinity to the eidetic laws of later
works.
In the nature of its contents, and the laws they obey.
certain forms of connection are grounded. They run
in diverse fashions from content to content, from
complex of contents to complex of contents, till in
the end a unified sum total of content is constituted,
which does not differ from the phenomenologically reduced
ego itself. These contents have, as contents generally
have, their own law-bound ways of coming together,
of losing themselves in more comprehensive unities,
and, in so far as they thus become and are one, the
phenomenological ego or unity of consciousness is already
constituted, without need of an additional, peculiar
ego-principle which Eupports all contents and unites
them all once again.`)
Husserl's statement in the Investigations that this
ego is empirical in the same manner as a 'physical object'
places the ego in the transcendent realm--transcendent
in the sense that it is constituted as an object whose
entire being pre-supposes and is referred to by what
is immediately and purely presented to consciousness.
Thus it, in its identical fullness, lies outside of the
immediacy of pure consciousness due to its constituted
horizonal inclusiveness.
In the Ideas, the effects of the phenomenological
epoche began to take force.

The phenomenal ego of the

Investigations was, of course, 'bracketed', or reduced
to mere phenomena, along with all other objects of the
constituted world.

But in the Ideas, Husserl admitted

6Ibid., pp. 541-542.
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another aspect of consciousness:

a residue of subjectivity,

of awareness, which remains after the epoche. This he
believed to be the pure being of consciousness.
• • *Consciousness in itself has a being of its own
which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains
unaffected by the phenomenological disconnexion.
It therefore remains over as a "phenomenological residuum,"
as a region of Being which is in princiFle unique,
and can become in fact thq field of a new science--the
science of Phenomenology.'
This aspect of the meditating philosopher's subjectivity--which remains after the constituted world (including
the constituted concrete ego, as experiencer of and object
in the world as pre-given) is reduced to the mere phenomena
from which genesis ensues--is taken to be that which performs
the original constitution.

This pre-synthetic synthesizer

is called the transcendental Ego.
. . .I am the Ego who invests the being of the world
which I so constantly speak about with existential
validity, as an existence (Sein) which wins for me
from my own life's pure essence meaning and substantiated validity. I myself as this individual essence,
posited absolutely, as the open infinite field of
pure phenomenological data and their inseparable unity,
am the "transcendental Ego"; the absolute positing
means that the world is no longer "given" to me in
advance, its validity that of a simple existent, but
that henceforth it is exclusively my Ego that is given
(given from my new standpoint), given purely as that
which has being in itself, in itself eneriences a
world, confirms the same, and so forth.°
By the Meditations the self-experience as a human
9
ego had been reduced to mere-phenomena.

What remains

is the transcendental Ego as a being which is phenomeno-

7Idem, Ideas, p. 102
8Ibid., p. 11
9Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 19.
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logically antecedent to all natural world distinctions--the
being of the natural world "continually presupposes the
1°
Hence the pure pre-syntherealm of transcendental being."
tically mundanized subjectivity of the meditating philosopher
remains independent of all natural modes of being.
If I keep purely what comes into view--for me,
1
the one who is meditating--by virtue of my free epoche
with respect to the being of the experienced world,
the momentous fact is that I, with my life, remain
untouched in my existential status, regardless of
whether or not the world exists and regardless of
what my eventual decision concerning its being or
non-being might be. This Ego, with his Ego-life,
who, pecessarily remains for me, by virtue of such
epoche, is not a piece of the world; and if he says,
"I exist, ego cog4co," that no longer signifies, "I,
this man, exist."
This results, of course, in the 'splitting of the
Ego.'

We may now see that this division is between the

synthetically constituted concrete ego (mundanized as
the ego "I, this man") and the pure pre-synthetic subjectivity
of the transcendental Ego.

The transcendental Ego exists

as passive observer--"disinterested onlooker"--of the
12
"naively interested Ego."

As the non-involved observer

the transcendental Ego is now said to have always been
present and presupposed; but not as entirely dislocated
from the naive ego.

The concrete ego--the ego in the

"natural attitude" of everyday acceptance--is and has

10Ibid., p. 21.
11Ibid., p. 25.
12Ibid., p. 35.
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always been a transcendental Ego but only through the
reduction of the epoche is this revealed.13
The transcendental Ego, we may say, is responsible
for the synthetic genesis of self-identical objects (which
exist as the constituted meanimgs or referents of the
genetically organized phenomena) from the flux of presentations.
These phenomena are congealed into meant identities on
both the noetic and the noematic poles.

From the noematic

pole is constituted the factual world, and from the noetic
pole is constituted the concrete ego who livingly and
naively experiences the world.
• • .for the ego of the transcendental reduction,
all that exists is and must be a constituted product.
. . . Conscious life is. . .constituted necessarily
as human in the constituted world, and as a human
conscious life in which the world is intended, psychically
constituted, and so forth. . . .
The first procedure in Meditations I-IV is to
awaken the guiding thought: The world is a meaning,
an accepted sense. When we go back to the ego, we
can explicate the founding and founded strata with
which that sense is built op [sic] Eden Fundierunfisaufbauj,
we can reach the absolute being and process in which
the being of the world shows its ultimate truth and
in which the ultimate problems of being reveal themselves-bringing into the thematic field all the disguises
that unphilosophical naivete cannot penetratelialle
Verhullungen der unplilosophischen Naivitati.
The world, as naively accepted, exists as meaning.
But meaning can only exist within transcendental subjectivity,
which, according to Husserl, is the "universe of possible
sense."

In this way the transcendent, factually existing

13Ibid., p. 37.
14Ibid., p. 52.
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world is not separate from the transcendental realm of
meaning constitution.
The attempt to conceive the universe of true being
as something lying outside the universe of possible
evidence, the two being related to one another merely
externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical. They belong
together essentiall; and, as belonging together essentially,
they are also concretely one, one in the only absolute
concretion: transcendental subjectivity. If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense,
then an outside is precisely--nonsense. But even
nonsense is always a mode of sense and has itsiRonsensicalness within the sphere of possible insight.
This leaving room for "nonsensicalness" as a "mode of
sense" is necessary; for from the "other side", as it
were, we see the obvious distinction between the constituted
factual world of transcendency and transcendental subjectivity.
. . .Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the
world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly
Object is a piece of my Ego, to be found in my conscious
life as a really inherent part of it, as a complex
of data of sensation or a complex of acts. This "transcendence" is part of the intrinsic sense of anything
worldly, despite the fact that anything worldly necessarily
acquires all the sense determining it, along with
its exis2tntial status, exclusively from my experiencing. . ."")
The transcendental Ego is perceived by Husserl at
this point as the subjective being, a Hericlitean flux17,
from which all meaning (including my own concrete ego)
is constituted.

The concrete ego results from the naive

acceptance of the meant constitutions.
The transcendental ego emerged by virtue of my "parenthesizing" of the entire Objective world and all other
(including all ideal) Objectivities. In consequence

15Ibid., p. 84.
16Ibid., p. 26.
17Ibid., p. 49.
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of this parenthesizing, I have become aware of myself
as the transcendental ego, who constitutes in his
constitutive life everything that is ever Objective
for me--the ego of all constitutions, who exists in
his actual and potential life-processes and Ego-habitualities and who constitutes in them not only everything
Objective but also nimself as identical ego. We can
say now: In that I, as this ego, have constituted
and am continually further constituting as a phenomenon
(as a correlate) the world that exists for me, I have
carried out a mundanizing self-apperception--under
the title "Ego in the usual sense"--in corresponding
constitutive syntheses and am maintaining l @ continuing
acceptance and further development of it.
This development is possibly due to association; such
as conformity of synthetic constitution to eidetic laws.19
1
In the Crisis, the epoche becomes more radical,
purging all personal aspects from transcendental subjectivity.
Husserl here claims that it was Descartes' mistake to
opt for a personal ego grounded in apodictic subjectivity.
It remained hidden from Descartes that all such distinctions
utside," first "constitute"
as "I" and "you," "inside" and
themselves in the absolute ego.
The concrete ego continues to exist in its horizonal fullness, but no aspects of this naive ego, or his life, endures
the reduction of the epoche. That is, all aspects of my
* uman (form of) being have their place in
life as this ,
the transcendent realm of meant objects; the realm of
pure subjective being is devoid of such distinctions.
Concretely, each "I" is not merely an ego-pole but
an "I" with all its accomplishments and accomplished
acquisitions, including the wprld as existing and
being-such. But in the epoche and in the pure focus

18Ibid., pp. 99-100
19Ibid., p. 81
20Idem, Crisis, p. 82.
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upon the functioning ego-pole, and thence upon the
concrete whole of life and of its intentional intermediary
and final structures, it follows eo ipso that nothing
human is to be found, neither soul nor psychic life
nor real psychophysical human beings; all this belongsn
to the "phenomenon," to the world as constituted pole.
This creates a unique "philosophical solitude"22
for the radically meditating phi3osopher.

From this vantage

point, "[C11 of mankind, and the whole distinction and
23 is reduced to mere
ordering of the personal pronouns"
phenomenon by the epoche.

In fact, the transcendental

Ego can be called "I" only by an equivocation necessitated
by reflection.

Husscrl holds that this reflective equivo-

cation is necessary, however, for "when I name it in reflection,
I can say nothing other than: it is I who practice the
.24
epoche. . • •

The transcendental subjective realm, which

was explicitly denied in the Investigations has thus developed
into a realm of radically pure transcendental being which
precedes and constitutes all transcendent distinctions
of being, both noetic and noematic.
The radically transcendental subjectivity exists
in its "own self-enclosed pure context as intentionality."

25

As a realm of pure intentionality, it constitutionally
intends all transcendent meaning, including ontic meaning

21Ibid., p. 183.
22Ibid., p. 184
23Ibid. (Bracket mine).
24Ibid.
25Ibid., p. 169
26Ibid.

26
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of physical bodies.

27

As such, we must also assume that

ionally
the transcendental and the transcendent are intent
ty, however.
co-dependent; the transcendental maintains priori
a
In the Crisis the transcendental Ego is opened from
phenomenological residuum to a realm of transcendental
to
purity--a realm of absolute subjectivity comparable
ntly
Heraclitus' eternal flux, the depths of which are appare
unfathomable.28 Within this subjectivity,
points
. . . every "ground" [Grund] that is reached
s
awaken
up
to further grounds, every horizon opened
ty
infini
its
in
new horizons, and yet the endless whole,
unity
the
of flowing movement, is oriented toward
of one meaning; not, of course, in such a way that
we could ever simply grasp and understand the whole;
rather, as soon as one has fairly well mastered the
universal form of meaning-formation, the breadths
and depths of this total meaning, in its infinite
totality, take on valuative faxiotische] dimensions:
sal
there ase problems of the totality as that of univer
'
reason.
What here emerges as important, in light of our
physical
present topic, is that the traditional dualism of
and nonphysical (or extended and non-extended, to use
ena of
Cartesian terms) are collapsed into mere phenom
transcendent being.

This transcendent being, to be sure,

stands in a seeming juxtaposition with transcendental
27Ontic meaning, for Husserl, is tied to identifiable
which
and distinguishable physical bodies (of all sorts)
one
.if
".
ties.
exist as substrates of causal proper
g
meanin
ontic
its
loses
takes away causality, the body
as
bility
guisha
distin
as body, its identifiability and
a physical individual." (Husserl, Crisis, p. 218.)
28Ibid., p. 170
29Ibid.

98

being which is revealed only by the epoche.

But this

is no dualism in the substantial sense: there are not
two distinct and incompatible substances somehow merged
together.

Rather, we have a fathomless flux of phenomena

from which transcendental subjectivity (as its own selfenclosed context of intentionality) constitutes a horizonally
given realm of transcendent identities (on both the noetic
and noematic ends of the intentionality) as the 'meaning'
of the flux of presentations.

This synthetic constitution

genetically builds up along lines determined by eidetic
laws of constitution.

The horizonally constituted pole

of identity in the noetic stream of the hi-polar phenomena
is genetically built up into a temporally enduring (noetic
temporality)concrete ego.

This concrete ego, as monad

of identity, finds himself in the paradoxical position
of being both a subject and an object in a pre-given factual
world (the horizonally constituted pole of the noematic
stream with its objective temporality).
By failing to perform the reduction of the epoche,
the transcendental realm of pure subjectivity is not attained
(although it always remains as an implicit assumption).
Thus it is impossible to reduce the psyche and the physical
world (the constituted noetic and noematic poles) to the
mere phenomena from which they are synthetically constituted
as self-identical enduring transcendent objects:

the

investigating philosopher, as a naively interested ego,
remains on the footing of the world. As a result of this,
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we are left with a world evidently split into dual realms-the realm of scientific nature and the realm of psychic
being.
When the epoche is not performed there can be no
access to transcendental subjectivity and the eidetic
laws of constitution.

For this reason, Husserl held that

the belief in God was an unavoidable conclusion of the
pre-reduction naivete.
Was God not unavoidable as the principle of rationality?
Does not rational being, even [merely] as nature,
in order to be thinkable at all, presuppose rational
theory and a subjectivity which accomplishes it?
Does not nature, then, indeed the world-in-itself,
presuppose God as reason existing absolutely? Does
this not mean that, within being-in-itself, psychic
being takes precedence as subjectivity existing purely
after all, subjectivity, whether
for itself? It
divine or human.'"
This, of course, was the assumption to which Descartes
had been led due to his failure to make the 'transcendental
turn.

By performing the epoche, Husserl believed he

was able to reach the subjectivity from which rationality
(in the form of eidetic laws of constitution) arises.
It is the pre-synthetic (and thus personal only by equivocation)
transcendental Ego--the presupposed constitutive principle
behind all naive living--which implied the being of a
God.
In a sense analogous to that in which mathematics
speaks of infinitely distant points, straight lines,
etc., one can say metaphorically that God is the "infinitely
31
distant man."
30
Ibid., p. 62.
31Ibid. 1 p. 66.
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But Husserl's theory faces two major problems at
this point.

First, there are any number of possible rational

worlds; how do I manage to find myself in the same world
as other men?

Secondly, if all that is given in the world

of everyday life is synthetically constituted by the'transcendental Ego, how does the phenomenologically meditating
philosopher escape solipsism; how does Husserl account
for other egos?

We shall find that Husserl answers both

solution.
,
problems with :)ne

SECTION L
THE ALTER EGO AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Husserl's notion of the 'alter ego' and lintersubjectivity' are worthy of full inquiry in themselves.
we
But in keeping with the topic of the present paper,
shall only summarize this intricate theory.

It is of

this
essential importance in comprehending the nuances of
enview that we bear in mind the relationship of the transc
world,
dental Ego to the synthetically constituted factual
as
and the concrete ego (which is genetically built up
a result of the naive acceptance of this world).
The transcendental Ego is responsible for the consti
s.
tution of the factual world from the flux of presentation
al
But because of the distinction between the transcendent
and the naive attitudes, only the concrete ego, as monad
can
of identity in the noetic pole of world-phenomena,
livingly experience the world as a really existing world.
Husserl's problem was to explain how this concrete ego
transcen(who through the epoche has gained access to the
knowdental realm within his own subjectivity) could have
te
ledge of another ego, and even of that ego's ultima
transcendental subjectivity.
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When the concrete ego encounters a body similar
to his own, only the body as pure immediate presentation
is given with originality.

But, according to Husserl,

this original and immediate experience constitutionally
includes aspects which I, as concrete ego, do not and
cannot have immediate access to. This is due to the process
of 'appresentation.'
Just as, in my living present, in the domain of "internal
perception", my past becomes constituted by virtue
of the harmonious memories occurring in this present,
so in my primordial sphere, by means of appresentations
occurring in it and motivated by its contents, an
ego other than mine can become constituted--accordingly,
in non-originary presentations [in Vergegenwartigungen]
of a new type, whicli have a modificatum of a new kind
as their correlate.
Horizonal constitution of identity incorporates apperception
in every form in which we have examined it; that is, something
more than what is actually and immediately given is included
as 'also meant.' But thus far, every case we have dealt
with has involved evidences of my own:

either as consti-

tuting my concrete ego, or as comprising my original experience
of an object.

But now, with the prospect of an 'alter-

ego', we are faced with a realm with which I can never
2
be originally presented, only appresented.
Whatever can become presented, and evidently verified,
originally--is something I am; or else it belongs
to me as peculiarly my own. Whatever, by virture
thereof, is experienced in that founded manner which
1Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 115.
2Ibid., pp. 118-119.
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characterizes a primodially unfulfilled experience--an
experience that does not give something itself originally
but that consistently verifies something indicated--is
"other". It is therefore conceivable only aslan analogue
'
of something included in my peculiar ownness.This realm, which is inaccessible to the direct
experiencing of my concrete ego, is absolutely necessary
for another such ego to even be a possibility.

Although

we rightly say that we encounter the other person, for
this to be the case there must be a region of being which
remains accessible only by apperception.
Experience is original consciousness; and in fact
we generally say, in the case of experiencing a man:
the other is himself there before us "in person".
On the other hand, this being there in person does
not keep us from admitting forthwith that, properly
speaking, neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor
anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes
given in our experience originally. If it were, if
what belongs to the other's own essence were directly
accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own
essence, and 4ultimately he himself and I myself would
be the same.
Synthesis, we have said, is an intrinsic function
of consciousness.

This function has been revealed in

its role of constituting self-identicalness within a flow
of presentations.

But another aspect of synthesis, termed

'pairing', constitutes similarity among constituted selfidentical objects.
Pairing is a primal form of that passive synthesis
which we designate as "association", in contrast to
passive synthesis of "identification". In a pairing
association the characteristic feature is that, in

3Ibid., pp. 114-115.
4Ibid., pp. 108-109
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the most primitive case, two data are given intuitionally,
and with prominence, in the unity of a consciousness
and that, on this basis--essentially, already in pure
passivity (regardless therefore of whether they are
noticed or unnoticed)--, as data appearing with mutual
distinctness, they found phenomenologically a unity
of similarity and thus are always constituted precisely
as a pair.
We have said that when I, the concrete ego living in the
world, encounter an animate body, the ego associated with
that body cannot be directly presented but only appresented.
Yet that ego and my ego are given in the same moment of
.6
consciousness due to an "original pairing.

In this

way his body, which is presented directly in my original
experience, and his ego, which is appresented with my
own in a pairing association, merge to present the other
as fully transcendent.
The appresentation which gives that component of the
Other which is not accessible originaliter is combined
with an original presentation (of "his" body as part
of the Nature given as included in my ownness). In
this combination, moreover, the Other's animate body
and his governing Ego are given in the manner th4t
characterizes a unitary transcending experience.'
This places the 'Other' (as a perceived body and
apperceived ego) in the category of transcendent objects:
i.e., not a real part of my own subjectivity.

But we

still have no reason to assume that the 'Other' embodies
subjectivity in the way 'I° do--especially transcendental
subjectivity.

It is Husserl's answer to this dilemma

5Ibid., p. 112.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., p. 114.

105

which ties us, nolens volens, to this world rather than
some other constitutionally possible world.

Husserl held

that the sense of objectivity, which belongs to what is
constituted within my subjectivity as transcendent, is
dependent upon other subjectivities and their intentional
constitutions.

It is the sense of ithereness-for-everyone'

(which arises from the non-directly accessible realm of
apperception) that provides the understood objective fullness
to what--purely speaking--is only immediate, subjective
experience.

Through the apperception of another subjectivity,

the world is horizonally co-constituted as factually and
objectively there.
The existence-sense [Seinssinn] of the world and of
Nature in particular, as Objective Nature, includes
after all. . .thereness-for-everyone. This is always
cointended whereever we speak of Objective actuality.
In addition, Objects with "spiritual" predicates belong
to the experienced world. These Objects, in respect
of their origin and sense, refer us to subjects, usually
other subjects, and their actively constituting intentionality. Thus it is in the case of all cultural Objects (books,
tools, works of any kind, and so forth), which moreover
carry with them at the same time the experiential
sense of thereness-for-everyone (that is, everyone
belonging to the corresponding cultural community.
.).°
I experience others then, as mpsychnphysical Objects"
in the world and also as "subjects for the world."

The

Other, likewise, experiences me as Object in the world.9

.
8Ibid.,
p. 92
9Ibid., p. 91.
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As I perceive what is constituted as transcendent
and actually there, I am, in pure immediacy, perceiving
'this side from here.'

The I which perceives this view

as 'this side' of a factually transcendent object is the
concrete ego who is constituted as encompassing a unique
noetic temporal horizon, thus himself transcending the
immediately given phenomenon.

When an alter ego perceives

the same object, it is from another vantage point, yet
it [the object] gives itself as the one identical object
which transcends both perceptive acts.

The

Ater ego

also exists as a concrete ego encompassing his unique
noetic temporal horizon and as transcending the immediate
phenomenon.

The one identical transcending object is

thus 'intersubjectively known' by distinct monads of noetic
identity.
For each, . . .the fields of perception and memory
actually present are different, quite apart from the
fact that even that which is here intersubjectively
known in common is known in different ways, is differently
apprehended, shows different grades of clearness,
and so forth. Despite all this, we come to understandings
with our neighbors, and set up in common an objective
spatio-temporal fact-world as the world about us that
1, and to which we ourselves none
is there for us
the less belong.
The apperception of the Other causes an expanded
sense of transcendency.

Not only does the factual object

transcend my immediate awareness (due to horizonally given
other sides, etc.), it also transcends the sphere of my

10Idem, Ideas, p. 95.

I07

possible awareness by existing as 'there-for-the-Other.'
The one identical object exists as a synthetically coconstituted object for both monads, thus achieving the
expanded objective sense of being transcendent to the
consciousness of each monad.

This sets up, according

to Hucserl, a modification in the sense of the world as
I primordially experience it; that is, as it appears in
my sphere of ownness.

This modification, called a "super-

addition to my primordial world" sets up the Objective
world as the "identical world for everyone, myself included"11
12
This is possible
which serves as an "intentional index".
because the other Ego ". . .makes constitutionally possible
.13
a new infinite domain of what is 'other'. .
This constitution, arising on the basis of the "pure"
others (the other Egos who as yet have no worldly
sense), is essentially such that the "others"-forme do not remain isolated; on the contrary, an Egocommunity, which includes me, becomes constituted
(in my sphere of ownness, naturally) as a community
of Egos existing with each other and for each other-ultimately a community of monads, which, moreover,
(in its communalized intentionality) constitutes the
one identical world. In this world all Egos again
present themselves, but in an Objectivating apperception
nse "men" or "psychophysical men as worldly
with the
Objects".''''
The "communalization of constitutive intentionality"
creates among the community of monads an "intersubjective

11
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 107.
12
Idem, Crisis, p. 172.
13
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 107.
14Ibid.
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15
sphere of ownness".

It is within this sphere that the

subjectivity takes form as a "transcendental We" which
16 The
constitutes the world as "Objectively actual".
Objective world, then, is actual as the meant object of

•

this intersubjectively communal intentionality, which
results in a harmonious constitution.
• • .the constitution of the world essentially involves
a "harmony" of the monads: precisely this harmony
among particular constitutions in the particular monads;
and accordingly it involves also a har9Tnious generation
that goes on in each particular monad.
Each monad is intentionally connected with every
other monad by the transcendental intersubjectivity in
which they share and co-constitute a common world.

Although

this aspect of a particular monad is, of course, only
appresentationally available to another particular monad
and thus 'irreal', it is nonetheless factual.
Whereas, really inherently, each monad is an absolutely
separate unity, the "irreal" intentional reaching
of the other into my primordiality is not irreal in
the sense of being dreamt into it or being present
to consciousness after the fashion of a mere phantasy.
Something that exists is in inteigional communion
with something else that exists.-According to Husserl, transcendental intersubjectivity
is, in fact, the ".

.intrinsically first being, the

being that precedes and bears every worldly Objectivity. .

15Ibid.
16Ibid.
17Ibid., p. 108.
,
18Ibid.,
p. 129
19Ibid., p. 156.

.19
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Each individual monad is, then, related intrinsically
to transcendental intersubjectivity.
is unique.

But this relation

Each monad exists as a constituted concrete

ego, existing in an objectively actual world.

The transcen-

dental subjectivity from which this constitution is performed
cannot, however, belong to this particular monad exclusively,
for no personal pronoun distinctions exist in the transcendental realm.
. . .each human being "bears within himself a transcendental 'I'"--not as a real part or a stratum of his
soul (which would be absurd) but rather insofar as
he is the self-objectification, as exhibited through
phenomenological se -reflection, of the corresponding
transcendental "I."`'
Through the epoche this transcendental inter-sublectivity
reaches ". . .empirical givenness on a transcendental lev,21
el. . • •

Other monads are thus revealed as the "transcen-

dental society of 'Ourselves'" from which the "real world is
constituted as 'objective,

22
as being there for everyone."

As such the difference "between other persons and
me as a person among persons is itself a constituted difference.
.23
• •

According to Husserl, all monads partake in this

communion of transcendental intersubjectivity.
monads must exist in the same Objective world.

20Idem, Crisis, p. 186.
21
Idem, Ideas, p. 15.
22Ibid., pp. 14-15

23
Idem, Cartesian Meditations, p. 64.

And all
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monads,
. . .there can exist only a single community of
there
Hence
monads.
ng
-existi
the community of all co
ve
can exist only one Objective world, only one Objecti
ve
Objecti
one
only
time, only one Objective space,
Nature. Moreover this one Nature must exist, if there
e
are any structurg§ in me that involve the co-existenc
of other monads.`‘

24
Ibid., p. 140.

CONCLUSION
We have seen that by explicating the intentional
connectedness of the act of consciousness to its object,
Husserl laid open the fullness of conscious experience
(termed 'phenomenon') for investigation.

By means of

the epoche, he was able to suspend all the validity claims
of phenomena and attain the purity of the apodictic experience itself: I cannot be radically certain that this
paper exists, but I can be radically certain that the
paper-experience exists.

This radical certitude (exposed

only by the reduction of the evidence of harmonious presentations to the apodicticity of pure experience as experience)
he took to be the ground sought by Descartes.
1
all
epoche,
the
of
t
standpoin
e
reflectiv
From the
claims of substantiality are reduced to 'mere-phenomena.'
As such the mathematized abstraction of dual substantial
realms is collapsed; that is, we attain a point of experience
which is antecedent to such 'mental acts of idealization.'
Husserl was thus able to dismiss Descartes dualistic substances
as 'abstracta', reducing Cartesian categories to 'merephenomena.' The categories of physical and non-physical
do, however, retain the benign distinction of 'varying
modes of presentation'; but they, iike all other presentations,
are no longer assigned the status of substantiality.
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Husserl is left with the bi-polar unity of the pure
conscious act and its object, or meaning (the noesis and
noema).

These are taken in their strict phenomenological

purity, and hence form neither a dualism nor a monism
in the substantial sense.

Through the functions of synthesis

and horizonal constitution, Husserl reconstructs objective,
lived reality from the subjectivity of pure experience.
We have seen that this is accomplished through the related
notions of inter-subjectivity, co-constitution, and transcendental communion.
Husserl's development of the phenomenological categories,
however, is of secondary importance for our present topic.
Our purpose has not been to defend the categories which
emerge from Husserl's phenomenology, but to examine his
conception of the way out of the Cartesian quandary.
Husserl's solution, of course, is that there never was
a genuine problem:

only a stubborn abstraction which

has become ingrained in our thought, and thus in our very
cognition of reality.

It is Husserl's method of exposing

thc experienced reality which lies prior to this abstraction
that is the crucial point of our investigation.

It seems

clear that if Husserl's beginning premises (i.e., the
move from harmoniously presented evidence to the apodicticity
of pure experience and the intentional bi-polar structure
of that experience) are admitted then the Cartesian categories
and their problematic implications must be seen as nonsubstantial.
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